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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Is the provision of the Divorce Decree requiring

Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter referred to as "Husband", to
pay the house payment actually alimony so that it is subject
to modification upon a showing of a material change of circumstances?
2.

If so, has there been a mater:ai change of cir-

cumstances since the granting of the Divorce Decree so as to
warrant the termination of said house payments by Husband?
3.

Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as

"Wife11, does not agree that Husband's Statement of Issues accurately sets forth the actual issues in this case, but Wife will
address each of said purported issues in her Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal by Husband from an Order denying
his Petition to modify the provision of the original Decree
of Divorce which required him to pay monthly house payments.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

The parties were divorced from each other pursuant
to a Decree of Divorce which became final on May 20, 1983.
Husband filed a Petition to modify said Decree of Divorce which
was heard October 3, 1984 by the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby,
one of the Judges of the Second Judicial District Court of
Davis County, Utah.
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3.

Disposition in the District Court.

The Honorable Douglas L Cornaby denied Husband's
Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce.
4.

Statement of Material Facts.

The parties were divorced from each other pursuant
to a Decree of Divorce which became final on May 20, 1983
(R. 53-57),

Said decree was granted pursuant to an oral stip-

ulation of the parties and said decree provided, inter alia,
that Wife was awarded custody of the three children of the
parties and Husband was ordered to pay $200.00 per month for
the support of each of said children (R. 54). Wife was awarded
no alimony, she having waived her right to either past, present,
or future alimony (R. 56). Wife was awarded the marital home
located at 55 South 4th West, Kaysville, Utah, subject to a
lien in favor of Husband in the sum of $12,340.00 which shall
become due and payable upon the happening of any of the
following events:
(a) The remarriage of Wife, or
(b) Another adult male living in the
home, or
(c) Wife's no longer using the premises
as a principal place of residence, or
(d) At such time as the youngest child of
the parties reaches the age of majority, or
(e) At such time as the home might be sold.
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Husband was also ordered to pay the house payments on the
Kaysville home in the sum of $276.00 per month until such
time as any of the five conditions set forth above might occur
(R. 55).
Although the divorce decree was granted pursuant to
oral stipulation of the parties, it is evident that Husband
clearly understood all of the provisions he had agreed to in-*
asmuch as he, as well as his counsel, subsequently signed
both the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
the original Decree of Divorce "APPROVED AS TO FORM" (R. 52
and R. 57).
The Findings of Fact of the trial court set forth
that Husband was employed at Ford, Bacon and Davis, earning
approximately $33,240.00 per year at the time of the Divorce
Decree, and that Wife was unemployed at that time but she was
then "seeking a teaching job" (R. 48) so that it was clearly
contemplated that she would shortly be employed.
Since the granting of the divorce decree, Husband has
remarried and his present wife is the non-custodial parent of
three children for whom she is under court order to pay $1.00
per month for each of the three children, for a total of $36.00
per year (T. 18). Husband's second wife also has joint custody
of a child by yet another marriage and she is under an order
to pay $1.00 per month for the support of that child also (T. 19).
None of these children have been adopted by Husband (T. 18).
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Since the granting of the divorce decree, Wife has
become employed as a teacher (T. 11) as it was contemplated
she would pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact
(R. 48) and she presently has an income of $15,100.00 per year
as a teacher (T. 30).
Since the granting of the divorce decree, Husband's
income has gone up by $1,000.00 per year to a present annual
income of $34,100.00 (T. 3).
Within approximately two years after the divorce of
the parties, Husband, on July 5, 1984, filed his Petition to
modify the Decree of Divorce in several respects. The only
change he is pursuing, in this appeal is a termination of
his obligation to make the monthly house payment. He claims
this is actually alimony (R. 71) and that there has been a
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, in
that Wife is now employed and that he has remarried.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The provision in the divorce decree requiring

Husband to pay the monthly house payment is not alimony, fgr
the following reasons:
(a) The parties intended that there be no
alimony and by their express agreement all alimony
was waived.
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(b) A court order is not alimony simply
because it is not a sum certain and is terminable
on certain contingencies.

Clear-cut examples of

such orders which the court considers to be property
settlement rather than alimony include the following:
(1) Periodic payments of retirement
benefits.
(2) The payment of Class Q allotments.
(3) Payments on debts and purchases
such as automobiles, etc.
(c) The characteristics of the order in this
case that Husband pay the monthly house payments
are not the same characteristics as that of alimony.
The divorce decree provides that Husband's obligation
to pay the house payments will terminate at such
time as another adult male lives in the home, when
Wife no longer uses the premises as her principal
place of residence, when the youngest child reaches
the age of majority, or when the home is sold.
None of these are the times at which alimony
characteristically terminates.
(d) The Utah cases hold that for purposes of
modification of a divorce decree, a husbandTs responsibility to make mortgage payments will be
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considered a property settlement and not alimony.
2.

Should the Court hold that the responsibility

of Husband to make the house payments is actually alimony,
there has been no substantial material change of circumstances
so as to warrant a termination of such

!f

alimonyM payment;;,

for the following reasons :
(a)

Husband's only change of circumstances

since the granting of the decree consist of an
increase in his salary of $1,000.00 and the fact
that he has married a woman who has a responsibility to pay $1.00 per month support for each
of three children not in her custody, and she has
joint custody of another child for whom she is
responsible to pay another $1.00 per month.

The

Utah cases hold that subsequent obligations voluntarily acquired should not reduce obligations under
a prior divorce decree.
(b)

The fact that Wife is now employed,

whereas she was unemployed at the time of the
divorce decree, is not a material change of circumstances, inasmuch as the employment of Wife was
contemplated by both of the parties and the court
at the time the original Decree of Divorce was
granted.

There was a specific finding of fact

that the Wife was at that time seeking employment
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as a teacher and everyone recognized that she
would not be able to support herself and children
solely on the child support she would receive,
without supplementary income from her own employment.
3.

The divorce decree should not be amended on the

basxs that the Husband now feels the original divorce decree
was not equitable.

Relief from such alleged inequity should

have been pursued by the timely appeal of the divorce decree
itself.
4.

Any claim by Husband that he was confused or

did not understand the provisions of the divorce decree are
without merit, inasmuch as he was represented by competent
legal counsel and not only did his attorney sign both the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
"APPROVED AS TO FORM", but so also did defendant himself.
5.

Husband's claim that the original divorce decree

was inequitable because when he makes the house payments he
receives less than half of the total assets, is not valid, inasmuch as Utah cases hold that it is not necessary that there
be an equal division of the assets.
6.

Utah cases hold that it is not necessary for

the divorce court to investigate in detail each property
settlement agreement reached by the parties, particularly
when represented by competent legal counsel, and the cases
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hold that it is not necessary for the "courts to question
the wisdom of a contract made by the parties".

In any

given case, there may be other considerations, known or
unknown to the Court, which the parties have taken into
account (such as the waiving of *limo*»v as in this case),
and the parties should be able to so contract if they desire.
7.

The Court does not have a duty in an order to

show cause proceeding to remedy an inequitable agreement
reached by the parties when represented by competent legal
counsel, inasmuch as such remedy should have been sought by
a timely appeal of the divorce decree to the Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
In the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d
1218 (1980), this Court stated:
"In a divorce case, even though the proceedings are equitable and this Court may review the
evidence, this Court accords considerable deference to the findings and judgment of the trial
court due to its advantageous position. On appeal,
this Court will not disturb the action of the
trial court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial court has
abused its discretion, or misapplied principles
of law."
There is no evidence in this case that the trial court
has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles of law.
The applicable statutory authority is that portion of
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows:
"The court shall ha^e continuing jurisdiction
to make subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties,
-9-

the custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, and health and dental care, or the
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and ntpessary.ff
The distinction between the right of the Court to
modify support and alimony allowances and its right to modify
property provisions of divorce decrees is set forth in the
Utah case of Callistcr v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d
944 (1953), wherein this Court cites with approval the
California case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d
15, wherein it is stated:
M

This does not mean that payments under
property settlement agreements may be modified
even though incorporated in the decree. They
may not (Citing cases.) But in such a situation
there is not the same underlying policy. The
settlement of property rights should be final in
order to secure stability of titles. Support
allowances on the other hand should be subject
to the discretion of the court as justice may require * * * It has been loosely stated generally
in passing that the divorce court has no jurisdiction to modify a decree based upon a property
settlement agreement. (Citing cases, including
Ettlinger v Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 144 P.2d
540 Supra.) However, that does not mean that the
Court does not have jurisdiction on an application for modification to decide correctly or
incorrectly whether the decree is based upon a
property settlement agreement, and is not subject to modification, or is based upon alimony
or support allowance covenants, and is subject
to modification."
This distinction between modification of alimony
awards and the modification of property distributions is further
clarified in the case of Foulger v. Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d
412, (1981).

On page 414 of that decision, the Court states:
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M

The change in circumstances required to
justify a modification of the decree of divorce
varies with the type of modification contemplated . Provisions in the original decree of
divorce granting alimony, child support, and the
like must be readily susceptible to alteration
at *\ later date, as the needs which such provisions were designed to fill are subject to
rapid and unpredictable change. Where a disposition of real property is in question, however,
Courts should properly be more reluctant to grant
a modifica ;ion. In the interest of securing
stability in titles, modifications in a decree of
divorce making disposition of real property are
to be granted only upon a showing of compelling
reasons arising from a substantial and material
change in circumstances. (Citing Callister v.
Callister, Supra)
The above holds true a fortiori where the
property disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation between the parties sanctioned by the trial court. Such a provision
is the product of an agreement bargained for by
the parties. As such a trial court should subsequently modify such a provision only with
great reluctance, and based upon compelling
reasons."
It should be remembered that in the present case the
provisions of the decree were made pursuant to stipulation of
the parties wherein both agreed to each of the provisions.
ISSUE I
IS THE PROVISION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE REQUIRING
HUSBAND TO PAY THE MONTHLY HOUSE PAYMENT ACTUALLY
ALIMONY SO THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION UPON
A SHOWING OF A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES?
One of the first factors to consider in determining
whether the payment qf the house payment should be considered
alimony is the intent of the parties themselves.

It is very

clear that they both intended there would be no alimony.
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Paragraph 12 of the Conclusions of Latf (R. 51) and paragraph 12
of the Decree of Divorce (R. 56) both state MThat the plaintiff
waives her right to alimony, past, present, or future." From
the beginning, Husband was adamant about not paying alimony to
Wife.

This was brought out at the modification hearing when

Husband was asked, MAnd you violently objected to paying any
alimony.

You said you are not going -o pay any alimony, even

though you have been married to this woman 12 years and you are
earning $33,000.00, you would not agree to pay her one penny of
alimony."

Answer:

"Because she was capable of working.11

(T. 14)
The trial court correctly perceived Husband's intentions regarding the payment of alimony when it stated:
"What it appears to the court to be is that
the plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because
-of the time of their marriage and the defendant
was adamantly refusing to pay any alimony but he
was agreeing for the sake of the children to do
something different, which is, I will pay the
house payment. That helps the kids. It doesn't
help me any but it helps my ct-ldren. At the
same time I will pay child support but I won't *
pay alimony." (P. 38)
Husband's claim that the requirement that he make
the house payment is alimony because "it is not a sum certain
but is terminable on certain contingencies" is not a valid
argument.

Divorce courts make many orders for the payment of

sums which are not certain and are terminable on certain contingencies, which are clearly not alimony awards.

One such is

an award of a portion of a husband's retirement benefits to a
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wife.

As set forth in the Utah case of Woodward v. Woodward,

Utah, 656 P.2d 431 (1982), a husband may be ordered to pay to
his wife a portion of his retirement benefits to be paid in
monthly installments terminable upon the tmcertain contingency
of his death.

Such is clearly construed to be a property award

which does not terminate upon the wife!s remarriage.
Another example is the payment to a wife of a Class Q
allotment which the Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of
Perovitz v. Perovitz, 94 Idaho 453, 490 P.2d 320 (1971) concluded was not alimony although it was paid monthly over a
period of years.
Another example of periodic payments a husband may
be ordered to pay which are not alimony would be an order that
husband make the monthly payment on an automobile awarded to
the wife.
Husband1s contention that the house payments amount
"to an open ended alimony payment that is conditioned on the
saim terms that alimony payments are conditioned upon" (R. 75)
is not valid.

The characteristics of alimony are that it ter-

minates at a specific time stated in the decree, or upon the
wife's remarriage, or upon the husband's death, or at such time
as the court may subsequently determine that a material change
of circumstances warrant its termination.

Only one of those

characteristics (remarriage of wife) is the same as the conditions in this case upon which Husband's responsibility to pay

-13-

the house payments is to terminate.

The other conditions as

set forth in paragraph 6 of the divorce decree (R. 55) are that
no other adult male lives in the home, that she no longer
uses the premises as her principal place of residence, that
the youngest child reaches the age of majority, or that .he
home is sold.

None of these are the usual conditions on */hich

alimony terminates.
Another case of significance is the Utah case of
Lyon v. Lyon, Utah, 206 P.2d 148 (1949), wherein a husband was
ordered to pay, inter alia, a mortgage payment on certain land
owned by the parties pursuant to a stipulated "property settlement11 which was incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. Thereafter, the husband sought to modify the divorce decree by terminating his responsibility to make the said mortgage payments,
and the trial judge at page 149 stated as follows:
M

And the court having determined that the
provisions in the decree of divorce herein, of
which modification is sought by said petition,
are not orders for the payment of alimony but
are accrued and vested judgments which this
court has no jurisdiction to modify by reason
of changed conditions11.
The husband filed bankruptcy and attempted to discharge his responsibility to make the said mortgage payments.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in its conclusion that for bankruptcy purposes the obligation of the
husband to make the mortgage payments was in the nature of
alimony and was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, but the
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Court cited with approval the trial court's prior determination that for purposes of modification of the decree the
mortgage payments by husband would not be considered alimony.
The court made this distinction at page 151 when it stated:
"The issue in the former proceeding was
whether the award was of such nature that it
could be modified under Sec. 40-3-5, U.C.A.
1943. The question now before us is whether
the award was of such nature as to be dischargeable in bankruptcy.M
ISSUE II
IF THE PROVISION REQUIRING HUSBAND TO PAY THE
HOUSE PAYMENT IS ACTUALLY ALIMONY, HAS THERE
BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE
THE GRANTING OF THE DIVORCE DECREE SO AS TO
WARRANT A TERMINATION OF SAID HOUSE PAYMENTS
BY HUSBAND?
Wife, of course, contends that this issue is not
applicable because the house payments are not actually
alimony.

For purposes of discussion, however, should it be

considered that such payments are alimony, there has been
no showing of a material change of circumstances so as to
warrant the requested modification.
Consideration will first be given to Husband's
allegations of a change of his own circumstances.

There has

been no reduction in his income since the granting of the
decree and, in fact, his annual income is now $34,100.00 which
is $1,000.00 per year more than at the time the divorce decree
was granted.

His claim that he has now married a woman who

has a responsibility to support four children is not valid.
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His present wife has three children by a prior marriage who
are in the custody of their natural father and for which their
mother has an obligation to pay $1.00 per month per child for
a total of $36.00 per year (T. 18). The new wife also has
joint custody for a fourth child for which she is under order
to pay $1.00 per month support.

This responsibility for a

total of $48.00 per year support obligation by Husband's
present wife is certainly not such a material change of circumstances as to warrant a modification of the decree.
Furthermore, under Utah law, subsequent obligations voluntarily acquired do not generally reduce obligations to
make alimony payments under prior divorce decrees. See
Carter v. Carter, Utah, 563 P.2d 177, (1977) wherein the Court
states on page 7 as follows:
M

A similar observation applies to the
defendant's contention that added financial
obligations resulting from his remarriage
should redound to his benefit herein. It is
usually said that subsequent obligations
voluntarily acquired should not reduce
obligations under a prior divorce decree.f!
Husband's claim that the fact that Wife is now
employed as a teacher, whereas she was unemployed at the time
of the divorce decree, constitutes a material change of
circumstances is without merit.

A most significant factor is

that although Wife was not employed when the divorce decree
was granted, it was clearly contemplated that she would
shortly be employed.

This is evident from paragraph 7 of the
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Findings of Fact, wherein the Court found as follows:
n

7. That the defendant is a well and
able bodied person employed at Ford, Bacon
and Davis of Salt Lake, and earns approximately $33,240.00 per year; and that plaintiff
is presently unemployed, but seeking a teaching job," (Emphasis added)
It was no doubt evident to the parties and to the
Court that Wife could not support herself and three children
on a total of $600.00 per month even though her house payment was to be made by Husband.

It was clearly contemplated

at that time that she would shortly be employed as a teacher,
which, in fact, occurred as contemplated.

The Utah cases

are clear in holding that under such circumstances, even if
there has been a material change of circumstances, the decree
should not be modified.

In the case of Felt v. Felt,

27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court
stated, at page 624:
"....we affirm our previous pronouncements
that a divorce decree containing awards for
support based on either expressed or assumed
facts contemplated by the parties or the
court or both, should not be modified when the
contemplated facts are obvious or agreed to by
the parties and in turn incorporated in the
decree, in which event the continuous jurisdiction of the Court to modify should not be
used to thwart the expressed or obvious intentions of the parties and/or the court-unless such contemplated facts lead to manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity."
The Utah Court so held also, in the case of Allen v.
Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970) wherein the
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husband was seeking to modify the divorce decree by discontinuing the alimony of $200.00 per month.

The Court found that

at the date of the granting of the divorce, the wife was not
employed, but contemplated securing employment within six
months to assist her in adequately maintaining a home for
herself and the minor child.

The husband contended that the

wife now had permanent employment and that this was a substantial change in the material circumstances of the parties.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower
court in refusing to modify on the basis that "the decree
of divorce, when granted, contemplated that the plaintiff
would secure employment and contribute to her own support.ff
(P. 1022)
A similar ruling was made in the case of Short v.
Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971), where the court
stated, at page 55:
"It appears obvious to us that the award
in the decree was consistent with and based
upon the assumption that Mrs. S. again would be
able to obtain employment--otherwise, the trial
court's socioeconomic philosophy would have been
superficially inane."
The trial court in the present case was clearly
correct in finding that even if the payment of house payments was considered alimony, there had not been a material
change of circumstances sufficient to justify terminating
the Husband's responsibility to make the house payments.

-18-

HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE C^
IF THE HOUSE PAYMENT REQUIREMENT IS CHARACTERIZED
AS A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT, SHOULD IT BE SUSPENDED
DUE TO LACK OF CONSIDERATION, WHICH MAKES THE
PAYMENT INEQUITABLE?
Wife does not believe this is a legitimate issue in
this case.

It purports to take the position r.hat if the

property settlement provisions of the divorce decree were inequitable, they should now be suspended.

Had Husband felt

that the decree as originally granted was not equitable, his
remedy would have been an appeal of the original divorce decree
to the Supreme Court within the time granted for appeals. This
he did not do. Notwithstanding his claims that he may have
been confused by the terms of the oral property settlement
stipulation recited to the court at the time of the divorce
hearing, both he and his attorney reviewed the proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce
before they were submitted to the trial court for signature,
and both he and his attorney signed the original Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce "APPROVED
AS TO FORM11. (R. 52 & R. 57)
Husband, in support of his argument, cites the case
of Fletcher v. Fletcher (Utah) 615 P. 2d 1218 (1980;, for the
proposition that in order for a cash payment to be classified
as a property settlement rather than alimony in a Decree of
Divorce, it must be paid to the other party as compensation
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for real or personal property retained by the paying party
and must be a sum certain.

No specific reference is made in

the said case for such a proposition and Wife suggests that
no such proposition can be found in said case.

The said case

does, state, bowever, that it is not necessary that assets in
a divorce be divided equally and it is also not required that
for each asset given one party there must be given an
adequate consideration to the other.

The Court does state,

on page 1222 that:
M

In the division of marital property, the
trial judge has wide discretion and his findings
will not be disturbed unless the record indicates
an abuse thereof."
The Court then points out that the husband's con
tention in that case that there must be an equalization of
the assets is a fallacious argument.

At page 1223 the Court

stated:
M

In continuation of his fallacious contention
that t-here must be an equalization of the assets,
defer iant argues each party should pay his own
attc ney ! s fees .If
The case of Davis v. Davis, Utah, 655 P.2d 672 (1982),
cited by Husband, is clearly distinguishable from the present
case.

The Davis case was an appeal directly from the original

Decree of Divorce on the basis that the property division was
inequitable.

There was no property settlement agreement in

that case and the trial court divided the property based on
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the evidence presented at the* trial.

In the present case,

the parties themselves stipulated to the division of their
assets, and the appeal is not from the original Decree of
Divorce as in Davis, but is rather from a denial by the
trial court to modify the original Decree of Divorce.

In the

present case, the Husband h* s apparently concluded long after
the divorce decree was granted that it is inherently unfair
and is now contending that on that basis it should be modified.

The Utah case of Foulger v. Foulger (cited Supra) dealt

with the same sort of a claim by a wife who sought to modify
a Decree of Divorce because it was "inherently unfair", even
though it had been stipulated to by the parties. The husband
in that case contended, as set forth on page 414, that:
"The property disposition in the original
decree constituted a court-approved stipulation
drafted by the parties dealing at arms length
without duress or undue influence."
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the original Decree
should not be modified.

In Joinp; so, the court stated, at

page 414:
"Where no appeal is taken from the original
divorce decree, however, a change of circumstances must be shown in order to justify a
later modification of such decree. Absent such
a requirement, a decree of divorce would be
subject to ad infinitum appellate review and
readjustment according to the concepts of equity
held by succeeding trial judges."
Of further significance is the Utah case of Land
v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980), wherein the Court
stated at page 1250:
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"....when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreezsnt, forged by the parties and
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such
agreement into consideration. Equity is not
available to reinstate rights and privileges
voluntarily contracted a ,ay simply because one
has come to regret the bargain made. Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the court vhere a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the
decree, and the outrigtc abrogation of the
provision of sucn an agreement is only to be
resorted to with great1 reluctance and for compelling reasons."
It is submitted that no compelling reasons have been
given for the abrogation of the provisions of the settlement
agreement in this case.
HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE D
DOES THE TRIAL COURT HAVE A DUTY TO SEE THAT
ALL AGREEMENTS BY THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE
ARE EQUITABLE WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTIES ARE
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND SHOULD THE COURT
HAVE DISCOVERED WHATEVER FACTS ARE NECESSARY
TO MAKE SUCH A DETERMINATION?
Wife does not believe this is a legitimate issue,
but affirms that the answer to such question is no. Husband
cites no cases in support of his position that the question
should be answered in the affirmative.
The Utah law on the subject is set forth by Justice
Hall in his dissenting opinion in the case of LeBreton v.
LeBreton, Utah, 604 P.2d 469, (1979) wherein he stated on
page 472:
"Admittedly, the agreement reached by the
parties in settling their differences at the
time their divorce was granted appears to be
weighted in favor of plaintiff since it assures
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her the return of all mortgage payments made
after the date of the divorce, plus one-half
of the remaining equity as of the date of the
divorce; yet it is not for the courts to
question tBe wisdom of a 'contrar ; made Try the
parties." (Emphas. s added)
Justice Hall then went on to point out that there
may well be other matters which were con *idered by the parties
when they made their agreement.

He ever referred to a relin-

quishment of alimony as such a consideration when he stated,
on page 472:
f!

0n the other hand, we are not aware of what
other matters were considered by the parties
when they made their compromise. Defendant
may very well have received other consideration
which prompted his agreement, such as concession made in regard to alimony, support, or the
division of other property.If
Judge Cornaby, in the present case, recognized that
the parties have the right to enter into an agreement, particularly when both were represented by competent counsel,
and he rightfully concluded that "unless there's something
patently unfair about it, the court has an obligation to let
them agree to what they want to agree to" (T. 38). Judge
Cornaby recognized that the parties may have considered in
their agreement other factors which were not a part of the
actual divorce decree.

This is evident from his statement

that: •
"I don't know if the defendant had some retirement that was being offset and this is a
consideration. I don't know if they had some
other property that had some value that he
was going to keep that was going to offset to."
(T. 39)
-23-

HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE E
DOES THE TRIAL COURT HAVE A DUTY TO REMEDY AN
INEQUITABLE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE
INEQUITY IS MADE MORE SEVERE DUE TO A CHANGE
IN CIRCUMSTANCES, ONCE A PARTY TO IT HAS
PETITIONED THE COURT FOR RELIEF, OR AT LEAST
TO MODIFY THE INEQUITABLE PORTION OF THE
AGREEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REMEDY 1-TE
INEQUITY WITH THE LEAST ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE
POSITION OF THE OTHER PARTY?
Wife again contends that this is not a legitimate
issue in this case and affirms that the answer to said question
is no, and the reasons for said answer have been set forth previously in this brief.

Husband's claim that the Court had a

duty to modify the decree in some other way such as allowing
him to keep all or part of the house equity accrued at the time
the last child reaches age 18 in lieu of removing the payment
entirely, is not valid.

A search of all of the proceedings

has not revealed that such a request was ever made, and
for the reasons given previously, it would be inappropriate
for the Court to make such a ruling in any event.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court refusing to amend
the Decree pf Divorce should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day <A July, 1985.

C. GERALD PARKER
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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RONALD W. PERKINS
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUITY
STATE OF UTAH

DIANA KERSCHNER,
Plaintiff,

/
/

vs.

/

JOHN H. KERSCHNER,

/

Defendant.

/

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 1-32735

v5-d?^)

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the
28th day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting
without a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present
and represented by her attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and the
defendant being personally present and represented by his attorney, Walker E. /uiderson, and the parties having entered into
an oral stipulation governing their respective property rights,
custody, support, alimony, attorney's fees, and all other kindred
rights, and the plaintiff having been sworn and testified in
open Court, and the Court having approved the oral stipulation

FXHIRIT A

-2of the parties and being fully cognizant of all masters herein,
and the Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclurions
of Law, separately stated in writing, HOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree ot" Divorce

from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 1933, provided sane is signed and filed with the Court prior to such date.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and

control of the three minor children of the parties, subject
to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable
times and places,
3.

That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $2 00.00 per

month per child as and for child support for three minor children.
4.

That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property

the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile
as well as her personal belongings and effects.
5.

That the defendant shall retain as his sole property

the 19 7 9 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat,
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as
his personal belongings and effects.

-36.

That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and

real property located at 55 Sout i 4th West, Kaysville, Davis
County, State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defendant in the sum of $12,340.00, which shall become due and payable
upon the following conditions:
a.

Plaintiff should remarry, or

b.

That no other adult mala lives in the home, or

c.

She should no longer use the premises as her prin-

cipal place of residence, or
d.

The youngest child of the parties reaches the

age of majority, or
e.

The home be sold by the parties

, whichever of

the above conditions should occur first.
7.

That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276,00 to

United Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such
time as any of the conditions riferred to in paragraph six (6)
should occur, whichever occurs first, but in no event shall
defendant be required to pay more than $276.00 per month to
United Savings & Loan relative to such obligation.
8.

That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the

1982 income tax return in the approximate sum of.$2,020.00,
and a check from the Terkelson Company.
a.

Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and

maintain the home, building and premises in good condition and
repair.

-49.

That the parties shall each be entitled to retain

one-half the 1982 Utah State income tax refund and jointly pay taxe:
10.

That the defendant shall maintain health, accident

and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so
long as same is available through any place of employment,
and should future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to
the minor children, the plaintiff and defendant shall each
be responsible for one-half of all sums not paid by insurance•
11.
(5

§1

approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names
UJ S
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HI

That there presently exists a savings account in the

of the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and
the defendants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such
account, and such account shall be used for the benefit of
the three minor children upon mutual consent for its use by
the plaintiff and defendant.
12.

That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony, past,

present or future.
13.

That it is proposed for the year 1983, that the defendant

shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax
purposes, and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for
income tax purposes, and such procedure being alternated every
year, and it also being proposed that such tax exemption claims
may be altered by the mutual agreement of the plaintiff and
the defendant in any year the parties desire to alter the exemption claims.

-514

That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the

sum of $380.00 attorney's fees and costs in this action.
DATED tuis

/f

day of {Mr oh, 1983.
BY T

£/
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WALKER E. ANDERSON,
Attorney for Defendant

DOIK^AS Is. CORNABY,
Distrrs£JCourt Judge

APR IS 1583

RONALD W. PERKINS
VLAIIOS, PERKINS & SHARP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 34401
Telephone: 621-24 64
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IN ThE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DIANA KLRSCHNER,
Plaintiff,
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND

vs.

/

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

JOHN H. KERSCENER,

/

Civil No. 1-32735

Defendant.

/
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This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 2 8th
day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby,
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting without
a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present and represented
by her attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and the defendant being personally present and represented by his attorney, Walker L. Anderson,
and th€5 parties having entered into an oral stipulation governing
their irespective property rights, custody, support, alimony, attorney's fees and all other kindred rights, and the plaintiff having
been sworn and testified in open Court, and the Court having approve
the oral stipulation of the parties and being fully cognizant
of all matters herein, enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That plaintiff is now and for more than three months

last past has been an actual bona fide resident of the County
of Davis, State of Utah,
2.

That plaintiff and defendant were intermarried in Clearfielc

Utah, on or about the 20th day of June, 1970, and ever since said
time have been and now are husband and wife; that there have been
born the issue of this marriage, three (3) children, to-wit:
Dawn Kerschner, age 10 years; Heather Kerschner, age 7 years;
o

35
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and Derek Kerschner, age 5 years; and that the plaintiff is a
fit and proper person to have the care, custody and control of

< CD
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^

said minor children.
3.

That although the plaintiff has been a true and dutiful

HI

wife, the defendant, since said marriage, in disregard to his
marriage vows, has treated the plaintiff in such a cruel and inhuman manner as to render further marital relations between the
parties herein intolerable, in that the defendant no longer desires
to be married and constantly argues and bickers with the plaintiff,
all of which has caused the plaintiff to suffer great mental distress and anguish.

-34.

That during the marriage, the parties herein have accumu-

lated a home and real property located at 55 South 4th West in
Kaysville, Davis County, Utah.
5.

That ciuriny said marriage, the parties herein have accumu-

lated certain personal property and more particularly household
furniture and furnishings, household appliances, 1976 Plymouth
automobile, 1979 Ford
6.

truck

, tent trailer, boat, motorcycle.

That during said marriage, the parties herein have incurre

the following debts and obligations, and that there may be other
o

§1
52
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debts, but to whom and how much are unknown to the plaintiff,

*l

but those now known to the plaintiff are as follows:

z^
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Approximately $23,000.00 due and owing to United
Savings for the family home.

co -J
Hz
* UJ
h- O
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Approximately $200.00 due and owing to Zions
First National Bank for the Ford truck.

So

7«

That the defendant is a well and able bodied person employ

ed at Ford, Bacca & Davis of Salt Lake City, and earns approximately $33,240.00 per year; and that the plaintiff is presently unemployed, but seeking a teaching job.
8.

That the plaintiff has retained the services of Attorney

Ronald W. Perkins, to represent the plaintiff in this matter,
and has incurred reasonable attorney's fees and Court costs herein,
which the defendant should be required to assume and pay, and
that a reasonable attorney's fees are $350.00, plus costs of Court
in the sum of $30.00.

-49.

That the oral stipulation entered into by and between

the parties constitutes a lawful stipulation and is approved by
the Court.
That from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the plaintiff is hereby entitled to a Decree of

Divorce from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 1933,
provided same is signed and filed with the Court prior to such
o
-J °
Z ^
LU CO
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date.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control

! |
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of the three minor children of the parties, subject to defendant's
reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable times and places,

CNJ O

3.

That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $2 00.00 per

month per child as and for child support for three minor children.
4.

That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property

the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile,
as well as her personal belongings and effects.
5.

That the defendant shall retain as his sole property

the 1979 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat,
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as his
personal belongings and effects.

-56.

That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and

real property located at S5 South ith West, Kaysville, Davis County
State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defendant in
the sura of $12,340.00, which sha^l become due and payable upon
the following conditions:
a.

Plaintiff should remarry, or

b.

That no other adult male lives in the home, or

c.

She should no longer use the premises as her principa

place of residence, or
o
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The youngest child of the parties reaches the age
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of majority, or
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The home be sold by the parties

, whichever of

the above conditions should occur first.

O

7.

That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276.00 to United

Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such time as
any of the conditions referred tc in paragraph six (6) should
occur, whichever occurs first, bit in no event shall defendant
be required to pay more than $276.00 per month to United Savings
& Loan relative to such obligation.
8.

That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the 1982

income tax return in the approximate sum of $2,020.00, and a check
from the Terkelson Company.
a.

Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and

maintain the home,building and premises in good condition and
repair.
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That the parties shall each be entitled to retain one-

half the 1982 Utah State income tax refund and jointly 1 iy any taxes
10.

That the defendant shall maintain health, accident and

dental insurance on the minor children of the parties 30 long
as same is available through any place of employment, and should
future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to the minor children, .the plaintiff and defendant shall each be responsible fcr
one-half of all sums not paid by insurance,
11.
o
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That there presently exists a savings account in the

approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names of
the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and the defendants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such account,
and such account shall be used for the benefit of the three minor

r- Q
CNJ O

children upon mutual consent for its use by the plaintiff and
defendant.
12.

That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony , past,

present or future.
13.

That it is proposed for the year 1983, that the defendant

shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax purpose
and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for income tax purpose
and such procedure being alternated every year, and it also being
proposed that such tax exemption claims may be altered by the
mutual agreement of the plaintiff and the defendant in any year
the parties desire to alter the exemption claims.

-714 „

That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sura

of $380 .00. attorney's fees and costs in this action.
15„

That said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein

all matters of property rights, care, custody and control of the
parties minor children, alimony, support, attorney s fees, Court
costs and other kindred matters that are contained in the oral
stipulation of the parties in the Court's Conclusions of Law.
DATED this

/f

day of ^tcch, 1933.
BY TIIEv COURT:
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:
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WALKER E. ANDERSON,
Attorney for Defendant
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JANE ALLEN (Bar No. 45)
Attorney for Defendant
261 East 300 South, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-1300

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OT UTAH
DIANA KERSCHNER,
Plaintiff,

URDER ON DEFENDANT'S
PETITION TO MODIFY

vs.
JOHN H. KERSCHNER,

Civil No. 1-32735

Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of October,
1984 before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby.

The Plaintiff was

present with her counsel, C. Gerald Parker, Esq.
present with his counsel, Jane Allen, Esq.

The Defendant was

After hearing testimony

and argument, the Court makes the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Decree of Divorce shall be modified to eliminate

paragraph 13 of the Decree, with the tax deduction of the parties
in regard to the minor children to be governed by the rule of the
IRS.
2.

Defendant's request that he be relieved of the

obligation to pay the house payment for the house presently
occupied by the Plaintiff is hereby denied.
3.

That paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce regarding

the maintenance of health, accident, and dental insurance on the
minor children shall remain unchanged.

4.

Defendant's request that the equity in the marital

residence be redetermined is hereby denied.
5.

The defendant may talk to the children on the tele-

phone without interference from the Plaintiff so long as such
calls are at: reasonable times and duration.
6.

The parties are mutually restrained from harassing

7.

Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and

8.

All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce not

the other.

costs.

herein amended shall remain in full force and effect.
DATED this

3

day of

-J}esq*

Jc<~

BY THE COURT:

Dpugla^/L) Cornaby
District Court Judge
Approved as to form and
content:

C. GerSld Parkfir"
Attorney for Plaintiff

1984.

1

them but we submit, your Honor, that under the circumstances,

2

it's appropriate and proper for the decree to remain as it is

3

at the present time.

4

THE CO0i*T:

D'. you want one-minute rebuttal?

5

MS. ALLEisi:

I just think it's clear, in looking at

6

this, that at beet this particular provision for ongoing pay-

7

ments is a gray area.

It may not be alimony.

8

THE COURT:

Gray, meaning what?

9j

MS. ALLEN:

Gray meaning it's'not called alimony, but

10

it's not called property settlement.

It's not called anything

11

and because of that the Court can probably quite reasonably

12 apply his equitable powers to see that something that is unfair
13 does not continue for the next 10 or 12 years while he pays off
14 the house and only get $12,000 in equity even though he pays all]
15 the payments for all of the years on the house and since she
16 has already been awarded her half of the equity at the time of
17 the decree to keep it, c oviously, the house was split.
18
19

she became quite immediately employed.

Usually alimony is

just to put the spouse who did not work, who bore the children,

20

back on her feet.

2

that it's just only the fair thing to do in this case is to

1

22
23

She is on her feet just fine and it seems

allow him not to *have to pay this payment any more.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

I will talk about the house

24
payment first.

The Court doesn't know why it's there.

It's a

25
very unusual provision, but parties, one represented or whether

37

1

or not they are represented by counsel, have a right to

2

stipulate and agree to what they want to stipulate to on their

3

agreements and unless there's something patently unfair about

4

it, the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they

5

want to agree to.

6

If that same thing had been presented to the Court without

7

the defendant being represented by competent counsel, the Court

8

probably would have challenged it at the time or at least made

9

it clear to the parties as to what you are doing.

10

were represented by competent counsel.

11

chose to do what they did, certainly I don't know at this point]

12

I may never know.

13

in the nature of alimony.

Both parties

Why in the world they

Defense counsel, of course, is saying it's
It sure sounds like it, and yet, the

14 stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be .paid.

!

15

I

Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property

16 settlement.

This is not obvious to me that it's property

17 settlement.

What is appears to the Court to be is that the

I

18 plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because of the length
19

of the time of their marriage and the defendant was adamantly

20

refusing to pay any alimony but he was agreeing for the sake of

21

the children to do something different, which is, I will pay the

22

house payment.

That helps the kids.

It doesn't help me any but

23
it helps my children. At the same time I will pay child support
but I won't pay alimony. That sounds to the Court like what
25
occurred but I can't say that's what occurred.

The only way

38

1

that that can be done and mind you, I didn't hear the trial,

2

I only heard a stipulation between the parties and so they

3

hammered out all of the details and they handed it to the

4

Court and I listened to it and I sayr will you agree to it and

5

they

6

and I asked each of the parties if they will agree to it or if

7

that's really their agreement and if they say yes then we pro-

8

ceed on that basis and that's what occurred in this case.

9

>ay, will you agree to it and I said, yeahr I will agree

The reporting clerk made rather detailed notes as to what

10 was agreed on.
11

So, as you each look at the decree to see what

it says I keep watching that minute entry to see the decree

12 matches the minute entry and the decree matches the minute entry|
13 It does say what the minute entry says they agreed to.

I don't

14j know if the defendant had some retirement that was being offset
15 and this is a consideration.

I don't know if they had some

16 other property that had some value that he was going to keep
17 that thxs was going to offset to.

I didn't know then and I

18 don't enow now and I can't jump to a conclusion that it's
19 alimony and it should be terminated.
20

I have to say that if it were alimony there has been no

21 showing that there is any change that would—The sheer making
22 of $15,100 for nine months a year is not in and of itself enough
23 to stop alimony.

The fact that the defendant remarries isn't

24 enough by itself or with the fact of the plaintiff having a good
25 salary.

I suppose good always is in quotes because none of us

39

sitting here would call $15,100 a good salary.
The Court doesn't know why the provision was put there.
It's odd to prt it until the youngest is 18.
like some additional child support.

It makes it sound

It looks like it's probabl^

in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed there is no such thing as
alimony.

It could be property settlement.

Over a term of

11 years which is the approximate period of time until that
youngest child reaches 18, we are talking about $36,000.
are talking about a very significant sum

We

of money and yet, if

the parties want to agree on it and they apparently did, at
this time r it isn't like the defendant didn't know what he was
doing.

He may have thought about it the day after or the week

after and said, boy, what did I do, but sometime approximatelywell, shortly less than two months he puts his own signature to
the document drawn by his attorney.
At least it may not have been drawn—I guess by the plaintiff's attorney and agreed to by the defense attorney and as
counsel said, very unusual because he even had the defendant
sign it, which is unusual, but it tells me that he saw it and
undoubtedly considered it after it was drawn, not only on
strictly the day of the hearing.
So, I am going to hold the—unusual as it is, the terms as
it is, even though it's there without any offsetting equity in
the house even though it says there's no alimony.

It appears

to be two intelligent people agreeing and knowing what they
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are agreeing to.

Can't tell you why, but the decree was there

and it will remain the same.

Parties agree to let the IRS de-

cide who is entitled to claim the children as deductions and
that can be amended to show that.
With regard to visitation.

Mr. Kerschner, if you cannot

fulfill your visitation you have no right to ask the plaintiff
to change her time with the children to match yours.
can ask her, but you have no right to demand it.

Now, you

On the other-

hand, Mrs. Kerschner, if he asks you if you agree, then you are
bound by it.

You cannot change.

I mean, it's true it doesn't

say it in the decree, but we expect parents to, when

they

mutually agree on something, they will be bound by it.
I don't know whether you agree to it or not, but if you
agree to a change then you will want to live up to your word.
Now, with regard to the phone visitation.

The children

ought to have phone visitation and it ought to be without any
eavesdropping from either party.
either.

I don't know if it's occuring,

We spent very little time on it.

Just say there ought

to be those rights and they ought to be respected.
With regard to the health and accident insurance, I think
we have got that cleared up.

The decree says that each party

will pay one-half of all medical bills not covered by insurance.
It doesn't make any difference, orthodonist or if it's an office
call and it's not paid by insurance.
so each pay one-half.

The decree says one-half,

While it's anticipated that only the
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defendant has insurance, it makes no difference who has the
insurance.

If you both have insurance it will be after that.

I don't show any other issurs.

Did I cover them all?

Who

is going to draw the older?
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:
in this case.

Thoy ar>* the moving party.
We will dLrect the defendant draw the orderl

That's all tcfay, then.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
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gency has passed.5 It has been observed
that the overall trend has been in the direction of absoluteness rather than conditionally with increasing weight apparently
being given to the presumption against intestacy.6
<***:
[3] Significantly, the testatrix did not
make any alternative disposition of her
property if the asserted condition precedent
of the second paragraph was not fulfilled.
Since she devised nothing to her husband,
his death had no significant impact on her
overall testamentary disposition.
"The fact that the testator made no
express provision for forfeiture or gift
over upon failure of the condition tends
to show that he did not mean to impose a
condition." 7
This will, considered as a whole, shows a
manifest intention of the testatrix to make
an absolute will disposing of all of her property. While it may be inexpertly drawn, it
is sufficiently clear that she did not intend
to die intestate, if her husband did not
precede her in death. If a literal interpretation of the second paragraph could be
deemed to create an inconsistency with the
plain intent of the testatrix as unmistakably revealed in the remainder of the will,
then those words should be disregarded.8
Furthermore, testatrix clearly specified her
intent and purpose to disinherit her six
grandchildren, who were the children of her
deceased son. It would be totally inconsistent with this avowed objective to construe
her will as showing an intent to die intestate if the condition precedent failed and
thus the grandchildren would inherit under
5. In re Trager's Estate, 413 111. 364, 108 N.E.2d
908, 910 (1952).
6. 1 A.L.R.3d 1048, Anno: Determination
Whether Will Is Absolute Or Conditional, Sec.
3, p. 1052; also see 1 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec. 9.8, p. 428.
7. 5 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec.
44.2, p. 400.

the laws of intestate succession.9 Such a
construction would produce an absurd result, clearly contrary to the intention of the
testatrix as it is ascertained from the four
corners of the will.
Testatrix clearly intended her two daughters, Tess and Gloria, to be the distributees
of all her property. This case is reversed
and remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed with the probate of the
estate in accordance with this opinion.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
HALL, JJ., concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.
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children in decree of divorce entered by
First District Court, Cache County, Ted S.
Perry, J. pro tern. The Supreme Court,
Maughan, J., held that: (1) under statute
governing disposition of propuly in divorce
proceedings and rulings thereunder, equity
of husband in home he pure! *sed subsequent to wife's filing for divorce was properly considered marital asset subject to division in divorce decree; (2) evidence was
sufficient to support trial court's awarw jf
alimony in sum of $300 per month for 162
months, provided that alimony was to terminate upon either husband's death T
wife's remarriage, as reasonable and app opriate sum for support and mainter*n^e;
(3) fact that father had inculcated older
children with antagonistic attitudes toward
mother and other evidence was sufficient to
support trial court's award of custody of
older children to father and of three younger children to mother; and (4) trial court
did not abuse its discretion in decree requiring two-week notice to arrange visitation of
children by noncustodial parent.
Affirmed.

1. Divorce <s=> 184(10)
In divorce case, even though proceedings are equitable and Supreme Court may
review evidence, Supreme Court accords
considerable deference to findings and
judgment of trial court due to its advantageous position.
2. Divorce «=> 184(5), 184(10)
On appeal of divorce proceeding, Supreme Court will not disturb action of trial
court unless evidence clearly preponderates
to contrary, or trial court has abused its
discretion, or misapplied principles of law.
3. Divorce <s=>252^
There is no fixed formula in divorce
proceedings upon which to determine division of properties; it is prerogative of court
to make whatever disposition of property as
it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for
protection and welfare of parties.

4. Divorce <*=>252.1, 286(8)
In division of marital property in divorce proceeding, trial judge has wide discretion, and his findings will not be" disturbed unless record indicates abuse thereof.
5. Divorce <s=»308
Court may not, under decree of divorce,
unless child has incapacity or disability, order transfer of property of either parent to
children for purpose of creating estate for
children's permanent benefit.
6. Divorce <8=*282
Theory urged by husband in objecting
to valuation of his presently vested interest
in certain retirement funds, which was not
presented to trial court in divorce proceeding, had to be deemed untimely when it was
first claimed on appeal.
7. Divorce <s=>252.3(l)
Under statute governing disposition of
property in divorce proceedings and rulings
thereunder, equity of husband in home he
purchased subsequent to wife's filing for
divorce was properly considered marital asset subject to division in divorce decree.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
8. Divorce <s=>253(3)
Marital estate is evaluated according to
existing property interests at time marriage
is terminated by decree of court U.C.A.
1953, 30^3-5.
9. Divorce <s=»253(2)
Evidence in divorce proceeding did not
support conclusion that trial court abused
its discretion in division of marital assets in
divorce decree.
10. Divorce <s=»286(8)
In reviewing division of marital property on appeal from divorce judgment, award
of alimony should not be included as marital asset which was distributed at time of
divorce.
11. Divorce *=>231, 240(2)
Function of alimony is to provide support for wife as nearly as possible at stan-
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dard of living she enjoyed during marriage
and to prevent wife from becoming public
charge; criteria considered in determining
reasonable award of support include financial conditions and needs of wife, ability of
wife to produce sufficient income for herself, and ability of husband to provide support.
12. Divorce <s=»231
Alimony awarded in divorce proceed
ing, which was not sum certain but was
terminable on certain contingencies, could
not be deemed in nature of property settlement.
13. Divorce <s=>240(3)
Evidence in divorce proceeding was
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding
that sum of $300 per month for 162 months
awarded for alimony, provided that alimony
was to terminate upon death of husband or
wife's remarriage, was reasonable and appropriate sum for support and maintenance.
14. Divorce <s=»224
Supreme Court would not order that
each party to divorce proceeding pay own
attorney's fees where trial court had conferred more favorable adjustment of resources to husband in consideration of husband's obligation to pay attorney's fees.
15. Divorce <s=>287
Since, on appeal from divorce judgment, there were number of factors to be
considered in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded appellee for
defending appeal, in addition to question as
to which party prevailed on appeal, case
would be remanded to trial court to determine whether award of attorney's fees
should be made, and if so, amount thereof.
16. Divorce <s=>298(l)
Fact that father had inculcated attitudes antagonistic to mother in older children and other evidence was sufficient to
support award of custody of three older
children to father and three younger children to mother in divorce proceeding.

17. Divorce <s=»299
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in decree requiring two-week notice to arrange visi~*tion of children by noncustodial
parent where, by reason of strong animosities generated over custody issue, requirement of rather formalized arrangements
'.ntil all parties involved had time to organize their n v lifestyles and gain greater
insight as \x> their problems could not be
deemed 'nappropriate, interim solution.
18. Divorce <s=»310
Tria1 court did not err in awarding
child support until each child to broken
marriage attained age of 19 where statute
conferred power on trial court in divorce
action to award support to age 21, and
where trial court made special findings concerning need for child support to age of 19.

Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Low &
Anderson, Logan, for defendant and appellant.
B. L. Dart of Dart & Stegall, Salt Lake
City, Bruce L. Jorgensen of Olson, Hoggan
& Sorenson, Logan; for plaintiff and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
Defendant-husband appeals the distribution of property and custodial arrangements
for the minor children in a decree of divorce. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. All statutory
reference are to Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
The parties were married in June 1961;
they are the parents of six children, who at
the time the decree was entered in March
1979, were the ages of 16, 15, 14, 8, 7 and 4.
Defendant was awarded custody of the
three older children and plaintiff was given
custody of the three younger ones.
At the time of marriage defendant had
completed two years of college, and plaintiff was a graduate nurse. During the
course of the marriage defendant has
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earned bachelor's and master's degrees as
well as taking additional classes in his specialty. At the time of trial, he was a tenured associate professor of electrical engineering at a state university, with a gross
salary of $28,426, exclusive of fringe benefits. In addition, defendant was a principal
shareholder in a close corporation engaged
in rendering professional services in his
field. In 1978, defendant received approximately $13,275 in wages and $7,500 in loans
from this corporation.
Plaintiff, throughout the marriage, has
worked as necessary to supplement the
family income, assist in funding her husband's education, or to provide a down payment on the family's real property. At the
time of trial, plaintiff was employed halftime as a nurse and her net earnings per
month were approximately $613.
In the distribution of the assets, plaintiff
was awarded the equity in the family home,
her automobile, some of the home furnishings, and her personal belongings. The
court found the value of this property to be
$31,200. Plaintiff was required to assume
and discharge a mortgage in the sum of
$29,208 on the home. Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the sum of $300 per month
for a period of 162 months, with the provision the alimony would terminate on her
remarriage or defendant's death. Plaintiff
was further awarded child support in the
amount of $150 per month per child and
$5,000 to apply towards her attorney's fees.
Defendant was awarded assets, which the
trial court found had the value of $63,126.
These assets included a parcel of unimproved land, a new home, his automobile,
certain items of household furniture, his
gun collection and certain other items of
personal property, the current value of his
equity in a retirement fund and other investments.
The trial of this case extended over a
period of four days, a considerable period of
this time was directed to the issue of custody of the six children. The plaintiffs evidence indicated a calculated course of con-

duct on the part of defendant to alienate
the children from her and to inculcate feelings of animosity and contempt for her.
Defendant denied this charge and claimed
that as the marital relationship had disintegrated plaintiff had withdrawn from involvement with the family, and defendant
had merely attempted to fill the vacuum so
that the family could ct itinue functioning
as an integrated unit.
The trial court found plaintiff had incurred the disrespect of the children by
reason of defendant's actions. Defendant
had either intentional y or unwittingly involved the three older children in the custody dispute betwee; the parties; so the children's loyalty to defendant had resulted in
their rejection of plaintiff. However, neither parent was found unfit. The trial
court recited its adherence to the standard
of "the best interests of the child" in resolving the custodial issues. In its findings, the
trial court contrasted the characters of the
parties and found plaintiff a better example
of honesty, morality, courtesy, and unselfishness. Defendant was found to have established better communication with the
children, but plaintiff's withdrawal was attributed to the emotional distress precipitated by defendant. The trial court acknowledged and rejected the recommendation of the social worker that the children
should remain together, and, because of the
alienation of the older children towards
their mother, the custody of the children
should be given to the father. The trial
court expressed the view the social worker
had not considered the long range effect in
making the recommendation, and the court
questioned whether defendant could, in
fact, devote sufficient time to six children
and still meet the demands of his profession. The two younger daughters were
found to be well adjusted in their present
environment Based on the foregoing factors, the older children were awarded to
defendant and the younger children to
plaintiff, subject to reasonable visitation
rights in the non-custodial parent. However, the court provided the visitation must
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be arranged by the mutual consent of the
parties two weeks in advance.

mere trustee to manage the funds for his
minor children.

[1,2] In a divorce case, even though the
proceedings are equitable and this Court
may review tht r/idence,1 this Court accords considerable deference to the findings
and judgment of fhe trial court due to its
advantageous position. On appeal this
Court v^ll not disturb the actk , of the trial
court unless th^ evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial court has
abused its discretion, or i isapplied principles of law.2 In application of these precepts to the record herein there is no basis
to interfere with the deer ion of the trial
court.

[5] These funds were held solely in defendant's name, and he received certain tax
benefits incidental thereto. He made no
attempt to transfer them to the children
under the uniform gifts to minors provisions of Section 75-5-601, et seq. His testimony indicated no more than an intention
in the future to use the funds for the children. He retained exclusive dominion and
controll over them. He merely indicated he
would have no objection if the court ordered him to place them in trust for the
benefit of the children. A court may not,
under a decree of divorce, unless a child has
an incapacity or disability, order the transfer of the property of either parent to the
children for the purpose of creating an estate for their permanent benefit.5

DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS
[3,4] There is no fixed formula upon
which to determine a division of properties,
it is a prerogative of the court to make
whatever disposition of property as it
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the
protection and welfare of the parties.8 In
the division of marital property, the trial
judge has wide discretion, and his findings
will not be disturbed unless the record indicates an abuse thereof.4
Defendant contends the trial court erred
in including as part of the marital assets
subject to division certain investments identified as SNI funds. These funds were
awarded to defendant, and the sum of
$6,000 for these investments was included
in the calculation of defendant's total
award. Defendant characterized these as
educational funds for the three older children, and claims he should be deemed as a

[6] Defendant further objects to the
valuation of his presently vested interest in
certain retirement funds. The valuation of
$16,939 as the current fair market value
was presented by a witness called by defendant. There was no other evidence adduced as to value. The theory urged by
defendant was not presented to the trial
court and must be deemed untimely when it
is first claimed on appeal.
[7,8] Defendant contends his equity in
a home he purchased subsequent to plaintiffs filing for divorce should not have been
considered a marital asset subject to division. Such an argument is contrary to the
specific provisions of Section 30-3-5,
U.C.A., 1953, and the rulings of this court in
accordance therewith. The marital estate
is evaluated according to the existing prop-

1. Article VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of Utah.
2.

3.

Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d 514
(1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072
(1977); Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752
(1978).
Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080
(1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d
235 (1977); Naylor v. Naylor, Utah, 563 P.2d

184 (1977); Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587
P.2d 144 (1978).
4.

Jesperson
(1980).

v. Jesperson,

Utah, 610 P.2d 326

5.

English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 412
(1977).
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erty interests at the time the marriage is
terminated by the decree of the court.6
Defendant argues the division of the
marital property was inequitable by reason
of the trial court's failure to give sufficient
weight and consideration to the liabilities.
During the pendency of these proce< iin^ ^
defendant purchased a home for $90,000, his
equity therein was found by the trial court
to be $6,500, which was awarded to him.
By taking this liability and the total sum he
may potentially pay as alimony, defendant
calculates the net value distributed to him
will be in a negative amount, while the net
value awarded to plaintiff will be $50,624.
(This amount is derived by adding $31,232
of assets awarded to plaintiff to $48,600
alimony and subtracting the mortgage of
$29,208 on the home awarded to plaintiff.)
Defendant urges a more equitable division
would apportion the marital debts pro rata.
[9-11] Significantly, defendant has not
specifically claimed the trial court abused
its discretion in the division of the marital
assets, and such a claim could not be sustained by the records. Furthermore, the
award of alimony should not be included as
a marital asset which was distributed at the
time of divorce. As this Court observed in
English v. English,7 there is a distinction
between the division of assets accumulated
during marriage, which are distributed
upon an equitable basis, and the post marital duty of support and maintenance. The
function of alimony is to provide support
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. Criteria considered in
determining a reasonable award of support
include the financial conditions and needs
of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and the
ability of the husband to provide support.8
6. Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 235
(1977); Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d
326 (1980).
7. Note 5 supra, at pp. 411-412 of 565 P.2d.
8. Also see Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d
144 (1978).

The trial court distributed approximately
one-third of the marital assets to plaintiff
and f ^o-thirds to defendant. In its findings the trial court stated:
"The Court finds that in lieu of ordering a cash settlement with a lien on the
Defendant's property to equalize the
prorx ty settlement, it is reasonable to
award the Plaintiff alimony in the sum of
$300.00 per month for 162 months,
provided, however, that said alimony is to
t> rminate upon either Defendant's death
or plaintiff's remarriage."
The Court further found such an award
resulted in a lower figure than would be the
case if a cash settlement for the difference
were imposed to be repaid at $300.00 per
month at eight percent interest, but the
Court also took into consideration the court
costs and attorney's fees the defendant
must pay.
[12,13] The alimony awarded in this action cannot be deemed in the nature of a
property settlement, for it is not a sum
certain but is terminable on certain contingencies. The record in the case will sustain
the alimony award as an appropriate sum
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff introduced into evidence a budget indicating
family needs. (She had excluded the costs
of real property taxes and insurance because she was unfamiliar with specific
amounts.) Her income was limited by parttime employment so she might give adequate care and nurturing to the three
younger children, ranging in age from four
to eight. Defendant had sufficient income
to provide support. The record sustains
trial court's finding that the sum awarded
for alimony was reasonable.9
[14,15] In continuation of his fallacious
contention that there must be an equaliza9. As explained in Jesperson v. Jesperson, note
6 supra, 610 P 2d 326, 328, this court is inclined
to affirm a trial court's decision whenever it
can be done on proper grounds, even though
the trial court may have assigned an incorrect
reason for its ruling.
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tion of the assets, defendant argues each
party should pay his own attorney's fees.
This argument is without merit. As noted,
ante, the trial court had conferred a more
favorable adjustment of resources in consideration of defendant's obligation to pay attorney's fees. Plaintiff has urged she be
a^ arded attorney's fees expended in defending this appeal. However, in addition
to the question as to which party prevailed
on appeal, there are a number of factors to
be considered in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded. Accordingly,
as to that issue, this case is remanded to the
trial court to determine whether an award
of attorney's fees should be made, and if so,
the amount thereof.10
CUSTODIAL
ARRANGEMENT
CHILD SUPPORT

AND

Defendant contends it would have been
in the best interest of the children to award
the custody of all the children to him. As
noted ante, the trial court made extensive
findings of fact concerning the custody of
the children and utilized as the standard in
making its determination, the best interests
of the children. Since the older children
had exhibited such a deep antagonism towards their mother, she expressed concern
about compelling them to live • with her.
Defendant, whom the trial court found to
have intentionally or unwittingly contributed to the alienation of the older children,
now urges he is the only parent capable and
willing to assume the custody of the six
children.
[16] The potential damage defendant
has wrought by his course of conduct cannot be underestimated, and it cannot be
deemed to be in the best interests of the
children to grant their custody to one who
has inculcated the attitudes exhibited by
the older children. The record and findings
10. Ehninger v. Ehninger, Utah, 569 P.2d 1104
(1977).
11. Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975).

indicate plaintiff would be the superior custodial parent. The trial court faced the
dilemma of compelling three teenagers
against their will to live with their mother.
To avoid further conflict and the potential
of further exacerbating the unfortunate division in this tragic family, the custody of
the older children was granted to defendant. Both the trial court and plaintiff exhibited wisdom in making this difficult
choice, and there is no basis for this Court
to intervene. This Court will not upset the
trial court's judgment in custodial matters
unless it is persuasively shown to be contrary to the best interests and welfare of
the children and family.11
[17] Defendant contends the provision
in the decree requiring a two-week notice to
arrange visitation constituted a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial court. This proviso is not engraved in stone and is subject to
modification as are all custodial arrangements. By reason of the strong animosities
generated over the custody issue, the requirement of rather formalized arrangements until all the parties involved have
had time to organize their new life-styles
and gain greater insight as to their problems, cannot be deemed an inappropriate,
interim solution.
[18] Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding child support
until each child attains the age of nineteen.
Section 15-2-1, confers power on the trial
court in a divorce action to award support
to age twenty-one. This Court has ruled
the trial court must make a special finding
to justify such an order.12 In adherence
with this standard the trial court made a
special finding concerning the need for
child support to the age of nineteen. Thus,
defendant's claim is without merit.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, WILKINS
and STEWART, JJ., concur.
12. Harris v. Hams, Utah, 585 P.2d 435 (1978);
Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 (1978);
Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 578 P.2d 1274
(1978).
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CALLISTER v. CALLISTER.
No. 7967.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 16, 1953.
Proceeding on defendant's motion to
modify decree of divorce. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson,
J., entered judgment reducing monthly payments required of defendant to plaintiff
from $400 per month to $250 per month,
and ordering plaintiff to pay her own attorney's fees, and plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Hoyt, D. J., held that payments made pursuant to provision of property settlement agreement which expressly
referred to such payments as alimony without anywhere referring to such payments
as payments for interest in property, were
alimony, and were subject to modification
by court granting decree.
Affirmed.
1. Divorce <S=>236, 245(1), 297, 309

An agreement or stipulation between
parties to divorce suit as to alimony or payments for support of children is not binding upon court in entering divorce decree,
but serves only as recommendation, and
if court adopts suggestion of parties, court
does not thereby lose right to make such
modification or change thereafter as may
be requested by either party, based upon
change of circumstances warranting such
modification. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 1
2. Divorce €=^245(i)
Payments made pursuant to provision
of property settlement agreement which expressly referred to such payments as alimony without anywhere referring to such
payments as payments for interest in property were alimony and were subject to
modification by court granting decree. U.C.
A. 1953, 30-3-5.
3. Divorce <S=200, 289
Purpose of statute authorizing court
granting divorce decree to make such orders in relation to children, property and
parties and their maintenance as may be

equitable, reasonable and proper is to give
court power to enforce, after divorce duty
of support which exists between husband
and wife, or parent and child. U.C.A 1953,
30-3-5.
4. Evidence €=>5(2)

It is commox. knowledge that parties
to divorce suits frequently enter into agreements relative to alimony or child support,
which, if binding upon courts, would leave
children or divorced wives i tdequately
provided ior.
5. Divorce <£=245(3), 309
In proceeding upon defendant's motion
to amend divorce decree, e i d e n c e established that decrease in defenc-mt's monthly
income and impairment of defendant's
health constituted change in circumstances
sufficient to warrant reduction in amount
of monthly payments made by defendant
to plaintiff pursuant to order in divorce
decree, and that reduction in defendant's
income was not directly attributable to voluntary impoverishment U.C.A.1953, 3 0 3-5.
6. Divorce <S==226
In proceeding on defendant's motion
for modification of divorce decree, evidence established that plaintiff had sufficient
income from property owned by her that
defendant should not be required to pay
her attorney's fees and costs. U.C.A.1953,
30-3-5.
James W. Beless, Jr., Gustin, Richards
& Mattsson, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Nielson & Conder, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.
HOYT, District Judge.
This appeal involves first the question
of power of the court to modify provisions
of a divorce decree which required defendant (respondent here) to make monthly
payments to plaintiff throughout her life
or until her remarriage. In 1945 plaintiff
(appellant) commenced suit for divorce and
prayed for division of property and for
alimony. During the pendency of the pro-

Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.2d 222; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah
196, 111 P.2d 792.
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ceedings an "Agreement of Property Settle- entered in the case contained the following
ment and Alimony" was entered into and recitals:
executed by the parties. In addition to
"That plaintiff be and she is hereby
provisions for division between the parties
awarded judgment against the defendo i ic«xl 2tf\d peisoraA property o i considerant i o i alimony in the sum oi ^AW per
able value the agreement contained the
month during the life of the plaintiff
following :
or until her remarriage, and for support money in the amount of $50 per
"That the second party (respondent)
month for the support of the minor
agrees to pay to the first party (appelchild
until said child becomes eighteen
lant) limony in the sum of $400.00 per
years of age. * * *
month during the life of the first party
o~ until her remarriage.
''That the agreement of property settlement
and alimony dated July 28,
"Sixth. This agreement and convey1945, heretofore entered into by and
ance is mutually intended to be, and
between the parties be and the same is
the same is hereby expressly made and
hereby approved by the court and the
intended by each of the parties hereto
same is hereby ordered to be binding
as a mutual release, relinquishment and
upon the parties."
conveyance of all the right, title and interest that may now be or shall hereIn July 1952 the defendant filed a motion
after be, during the lifetime or at the
to amend the judgment with respect to
death of either of the parties hereto,
the monthly payments, and asked the court
acquired by the other by virtue of said
to reduce the amount from $400 to $200
marriage that now subsists between the
per month, alleging as grounds therefor
parties hereto under the laws of the
that defendant's income had been mateState of Utah, in and to all of the proprially reduced and his health impaired since
yl ty, both ptYsoroA a.Tid i^2ii, oi the oththe rendition oi the decree. Plaintiff filed
er party, except to the extent of the
an amended answer denying the defendant's
moneys to be paid by the second party
allegations. The original answer is not
to the first party as alimony and supshown as a part of the record on appeal.
port money; and it is the intention of
Trial of issues was had and the court found
the parties hereto to mutually release
that since the rendition of the decree the
and waive all provisions of the laws
defendant's income from his practice as a
of the State of Utah relating to husphysician and surgeon had decreased from
band and wife as to dower or the in$1,000 per month to $600 per month; that
terests of the wife in the real property,
lie had remarried and had a wife and
homestead rights, etc., and forever bar
child to support; that since 1949 he had
each other respectively from rights of
suffered from heart trouble which had
succession or inheritance by reason of
become progressively worse, making it
the marriage relation existing between
riecessary for him to abstain from activities
them.
producing physical or mental strain, there"Seventh Second
party
hereby
agrees to pay all attorneys' fees, costs,
and expenses in any manner incurred
by first party in the enforcement of
this contract, or by reason of any controversy arising therefrom."
T h e plaintiff was granted a dworce, custody of a minor child, and judgment for
division of property in accordance with the
terms of the agreement mentioned.
A
copy of the agreement was attached to the
court's findings and by reference incorporated as a part of the findings. The decree
261 P.2d—*>

by reducing his income from his profession;
also that plaintiff had income from rentals
in excess of $4,500 per year besides some
income from investments in stocks. The
court concluded that monthly payments
required of defendant to plaintiff should
be reduced from. §4QQ pec month to $2SQ
per month, also that defendant should not
be required to pay plaintiffs attorney fees
in the proceeding. Judgment was entered
accordingly. Defendant appeals and asserts
(.1) that the judgment requiring monthly
payments is not subject to modification;
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that it was based upon an agreement for
property settlement and that the payments
required do not fall within the accepted
definition of alimony; (2) that the evidence does not support the findings of the
court relative to change of circumstances
upon which the judgment is based; (3) that
voluntary impoverishment is not ground
for modification of the decree; (4) that
the court erred in not allowing plaintiff
her attorney fees.

as here and that this case must therefore
be distinguished and should be governed by
the doctrine announced in Dickey v. Dickey,
154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A.L.R. 634, and
North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d
582, 109 A.L.R. 1061. Plaintiff also cites
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 44
P.2d 540; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d
833, 136 P.2d 1; and Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal.
App.2d 526, 112 P.2d 780. Counsel contends that in these cases it is held that
where there has been a property settlement
agreement, coupled with an agreement for
monthly payments, and the court has approved of such agreement and adopted
it in the divorce decree, the provision for
monthly payments is an inseparable part
of the property settlement and therefore
may not be subsequently modified except by
consent of both parties.

Our statute Sec. 30-3-5, U.GA.1953, provides that:
"When a decree of divorce is made
the court may make such orders in relation to the children, property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable
* * *. Such subsequent changes or
new orders may be made by the court
It is noted that in Dickey v. Dickey,
with respect to the disposal of the
supra, the Supreme Court of Maryland held
children or the distribution of property
that where both.the agreement and the deas shall be reasonable and proper."
This court has interpreted the statute cree provided for monthly payments during
to authorize the courts to increase or de- the life or until the remarriage of tlie wife,
crease alimony payments upon a showing such payments could not be considered to
be alimony, and therefore the court did not
of substantial change of circumstances.
have jurisdiction either to modify the deBuzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362.
cree or to enforce the payments of contempt
It is generally held that under such a
proceedings. This was based upon the
statute the court can modify a decree for
view that the court in the divorce action
alimony regardless of whether the decree
did not have power, in the absence of agreewas based upon an agreement of the parment by the parties, to grant a judgment
ties. See annotations in 58 A.L.R. 639;
requiring payment of alimony after the
109 A.L.R. 1068; 166 A.L.R. 675.
death of the husband, and having granted
[1] This court has held that, by reason judgment based upon the contract of the
of the statute, an agreement or stipulation parties, which might require payments aftbetween parties to a divorce suit as to ali- er the husband's death, such payments could
mony or payments for support of children not be considered alimony.
is not binding upon the court in entering a
This view is opposed to the majority of
divorce decree, but serves only as a recom- appellate decisions as appears from annomendation, and if the court adopts the tations in 18 A.L.R. 1047, 1050, and 101
suggestion of the parties it does not there- A.L.R. 324, 326, and is not in harmony with
by lose the right to make such modification views of this court as announced in Muror change thereafter as may be requested by phy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010,
either party, based upon change of circum- 1012, 70 Am.St.Rep. 767. The Utah statstances warranting such
modification. ute at the time of that decision was subJones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.2d 222; stantially the same as now. The court said:
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196,
"This statute is broad and compre111 P.2d 792.
hensive. Under it the court has power
to make such a decree as the circumCounsel for plaintiff contends however
stances may warrant, and doubtless, if
that in the above cases there was not inthere is danger of the father squandervolved a property settlement agreement such
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ing the estate, or if, from hostility or
other cause he is likely to refuse maintenance to his wife, or support to his
children awarded to her, and thus leave
the children to be supported by the
mother without aid from his estate, the
court may make such order, respecting
the property and the support and maintenance of the wife and children, as is
just and equitable, and such order or
decree may be made to continue in
force after his decease; and the court
may afterwards, if occasion shall require it, make such change in any decree as 'will be conducive to the best interests of all parties concerned/
* * * it is the solemn duty of every
husband and father to support his wife
during life, and his children during
their minority, suitably to their station
in life, and, if he fail to do so, every
principle of justice demands that they
be thus supported out of his estate. 0
It is true that in that case the claim made
against the deceased husband's estate was
for support of a minor child, but the opinion
expressed as to the power of the court under the statute to award alimony to continue after the death of the husband appears to be supported by the weight of judicial authority.

the wife agreed to release the husband
from any further obligation to pay alimony
or to support and maintain her. Under
such an agreement and decree it would be
unreasonable to reduce the payments ordered to be made. But insofar as the decision might be considered authority for
the doctrine that the court has not jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony in
a case where there has been a property
settlement, we are not inclined to follow it.
In the California cases cited by plaintiff, it appears that the contract provisions
relative to installment payments were found
to be an integral element in the settlement
of property rights, and that this was the
basis for the holdings that the court could
not subsequently modify the decree. In
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, the opinion recites:
"The agreement indicates that the
monthly payments to be made thereunder by defendant to plaintiff, stated to
be for the latter's 'support and maintenance/ constituted an integral and
important element in the amicable adjustment and liquidation of such property rights. In our opinion, the contract suggests that such payments were
to be made to and received by plaintiff
as part of the property settlement and
in lieu of property rights (emphasis
added). This would appear to have
been recognized in both the interlocutory and final decrees of divorce, for each
provides that 'neither the making of
this decree nor anything herein contained shall in any manner modify, restrict, affect or prejudice the provisions
or any of them, of said agreement hereinabove mentioned * * * which agreement * * * shall remain in full
force and effect' " [3 Cal.2d 172, 44
P.2d 543.]

In North v. North, supra, the Supreme
Court of Missouri held that in a divorce
proceeding the court had no power to enter judgment calling for payments after the
death of the husband, except pursuant to
consent or agreement and that where a
contract had been entered into for a division of property and for payment of $500
per month until the death or remarriage of
the wife, with a note and trust deed given
to secure performance, and where the divorce decree approved the contract and incorporated its terms in the judgment, the
A subsequent opinion by the Supreme
court had no jurisdiction to subsequently
Court
of California, Hough v. Hough, 26
reduce the monthly payments, regardless of
Cal.2d
605, 160 P 2 d 15, 18, clarifies and
the fact that they were referred to in the
decree as alimony. It should be noted how- appears to set at rest the law of Caliever that in that case a note and trust deed fornia relative to the issue here under
had been given to secure payment of the discussion. It quotes with approval the folinstallments of so-called alimony and the lowing from 39 Michigan Law Review 128 :
agreement expressly recited that in con"Assuming that the court has power
sideration of the provisions made for her,
by statute to modify a decree not based
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on contract, it would seem that in the
view of most courts there is no sufficient reason to take the decree based
on contract out of the operation of the
statute as to the alimony provisions.
That the interest of the state in the
marital status and the dissolution thereof is sufficient reason to support such
a view hardly seems to require demonstration. * * * The obligation to
pay alimony or support money to a divorced wife is one peculiarly justified
by considerations of social desirability
and generally prescribed as a consequence to dissolution of the marital relation. Being a continuing obligation,
and being subject to scrutiny of the
courts as to fairness and adequacy at
its inception, it should so remain and
the contract of the parties should not
be allowed to oust the court of power
otherwise exercisable."

appears to have been of approximately
equal value. The language of the paragraph relating to monthly payments to the
plaintiff clearly shows that it was intended
to be for support of the plaintiff. It is expressly referred to as "alimony." The paragraph begins with the statement that "the
second party agrees to pay to first party
alimony in the sum of $400 per month
during the life of the first party." It ends
with the statement "The alimony and support money payments herein mentioned
shall be paid to first party on or before the
5th day of each and every month." There
is no statement anywhere in the agreement
that the monthly payments constituted payment for plaintiff's interest in property decreed to defendant. In paragraph Sixth of
the agreement, hereinabove quoted, the payments to be made to plaintiff are again referred to as "alimony." In view of these
facts we hold that the payments must be
considered alimony for support of plaintiff.
The court then says:
W e further hold that these provisions are
"This does not mean that payments
not an inseparable part of the agreement reunder property settlement agreements
lating to division of property and that by
may be modified even though incorpoapproval of the agreement in the decree
rated in the decree. They may n o t
the court did not divest itself of jurisdiction
(Citing cases.) But.in such a situation
under the statute to make such subsequent
there is not the same underlying policy.
changes and orders with respect to alimony
The settlement of property rights
payments as might be reasonable and propshould be final in order to secure stabilier, based upon change of circumstances.
ty of titles. Support allowances on the
W e hold this to be true even though the
other hand should be subject to the
provisions of the agreement should be indiscretion of the court as justice may
terpreted to mean that the parties intendrequire. * * * It has been loosely
ed to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable
stated generally in passing that the diamount of monthly alimony. The object
vorce court has no jurisdiction to modiand purpose of the statute is to give the
fy a decree based upon a property setcourts power to enforce, after divorce,
tlement agreement. (Citing cases, inthe duty of support which exists between
cluding Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra.)
a husband and wife or parent and child.
However, that does not mean that the
Legislators .who enacted the law were
court does not have jurisdiction on an
probably aware of a fact, which is a
application for modification to decide
matter of common knowledge to trial
correctly or incorrectly whether the decourts, that parties to divorce suits frecree is based upon a property settlement
quently enter into agreements relative to
agreement, and is not subject to modifialimony or for child support which, if bindcation, or is based upon alimony or suping upon the courts, would leave children
port allowance covenants, and is subor divorced wives inadequately provided
ject to modification."
for. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that
the law was intended to give courts
[2-4] In the case before us the agreement provided for division of property to power to disregard the stipulations or agreeeach of the parties which so far as shown ments of the parties in the first instance
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and enter judgment for such alimony or
child support as appears reasonable, and to
thereafter modify such judgments when
change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of attempts of the parties to control the
matter by contract Under the authorities
herein cited such a view seems to be generally if not universally adhered to by the
courts. If it were held otherwise in this
case, in which a husband asks for reduction
of alimony, it would establish a precedent
which in future cases might prevent divorced wives in serious distress from obtaining increased alimony from ex-husbands possessed of wealth or ample income
to provide for them. We hold that the trial
court had power and jurisdiction to modify
the decree of divorce with respect to the
payments involved herein.

have been foreseen with any degree of
certainty. W e believe from a reading of
the transcript and exhibits that the findings
of the trial court are approximately correct as to the income of the-defendant from
his profession at the time of the decree
and at the time of the order for modification. His income from other sources appears to have been approximately $7,000
per year at the time of the divorce, and
almost entirely from stocks and bonds
which were then divided approximately
equally between plaintiff and defendant.
Defendant's income from sources other
than his profession during the year 1951
appears to have been $3,243.11 and in 1950,
$3,250.62. The evidence shows that the
defendant was fifty-eight years of age at
time of proceedings for modification, thatbetween April 1949 and November 1952 he
had three examinations by a recognized
heart specialist; that such examinations
showed a developing abnormality of the
heart, indicating coronary disease, and that
the specialist had advised defendant to reduce his activities and avoid strain and exhaustion. We believe the evidence justified a finding that defendant's health has
become impaired to some extent and that
this condition will probably result in reducing defendant's income. We also believe that the evidence shows that plaintiff
has a sufficient income from property owned
by her to justify the court's ruling that defendant should not be required to pay her
attorney fees and costs in these proceedings.

[5,6] Plaintiff's next contention, that
the evidence does not support the trial
court's findings, nor its conclusions of law
and judgment, makes it necessary for us
to review the evidence since this is an equity
case. Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52
P. 9; Utah Const. A r t 8, Sec. 9. However,
there is little or no dispute between the
parties as to the evidence. The testimony
of witnesses is also substantially without
conflict. The trial court found that the
income of the defendant from his profession as a physician and surgeon at the time
of the divorce was approximately $1,000
per month and that at the time of the proceedings for modification it had decreased
to approximately $600 per month. Counsel
for plaintiff contends that the decrease in
The judgment of the trial court will be
income "is directly attributable to the luxaffirmed. Each party to bear his or her own
ury of a clinic which the defendant percosts.
sists in maintaining" and it is asserted that
voluntary impoverishment is not a ground
W O L F E , C. J., and McDONOUGH and
for reduction of alimony. With the latter
WADE, JJ., concur.
statement we agree, but we cannot say that
the circumstances shown by the evidence
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified himas to maintenance of the clinic by defend- self, does not participate herein.
ant amounts to voluntary impoverishment.
It may not have proved a profitable venH E N R I O D , Justice, does not participate
ture, but we cannot say that that could herein.
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evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the defendants as partners received
the benefit of the money loaned by the
plaint^ and that they are each-liable for
its repayment.4 In conformity with the
statement in the comment just quoted
above, the fact that defendant Morgan
signed a note acknowledging his obligation
does not relieve the defendant Green of his
obligation.
[3] The final matter to be addressed is
the assertion of plaintiffs in their respondents' brief that they are entitled to the full
$3,700 face amount of the promissory note,
plus interest, without deduction for the
amounts paid by the defendants by the
checks above referred to. Their argument
is that the defendants failed to plead the
defense of payment and that the issue was
thus not properly before the trial court.
The argument is without merit. Under our
modernized rules of procedure, Rule 54(c),
U.R.C.P., provides that the court shall render the judgment to which the evidence
shows the parties are entitled, even if not so
requested in the pleadings.
What has just been said sufficiently disposes of the plaintiffs contention. But in
supplement thereto, we further observe
that the defendant did not comply with the
requirements of Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., relating to cross appeals.6 The judgment of the
trial court is affirmed in its entirety, the
parties to bear their own costs.
HALL and HOWE, JJ., and CALVIN
GOULD, District Judge, concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat.
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Heidemarie G. FOULGER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
John C. FOUGLER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16909.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1981.

Former husband appealed from order
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County,
David Sam, J., granting former wife's motion for modification of decree of divorce.
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that no
compelling reasons were shown by former
wife which would warrant modification of
property disposition portion of divorce decree.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result.
Maughan, C. J., concurred in result and
filed a statement.

1. Divorce <£=»164
Trial court sitting in divorce matter
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such
modifications in initial decree of divorce as
it deems just and equitable, but where no
appeal is taken from original decree, change
of circumstances must be shown to justify
later modification. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
2. Divorce <s=>254(2)
Court should be reluctant to grant
modification of provisions of divorce decree
which dispose of real property, and grant
such modifications only upon showing of
compelling reasons arising from substantial
and material change in circumstances.

5. That this Court will affirm the trial court on 6. See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst.,
Utah, 617 P.2d 700, 701 (1980).
any proper ground apparent from the record,
see Edwards v. Iron County, Utah, 531 P.2d 476
(1975); Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, Utah, 595
P.2d 860 (1979).
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3. Divorce <s=» 254(2)
Where property disposition is product
of agreement and stipulation between the
parties, and sanctioned by trial court, trial
court should subsequently modify such provisions only with great reluctance and
based upon compelling reasons.
4. Divorce <s=» 254(2)
At time of making of stipulated property settlement, adopted by trial court in
original divorce decree, which awarded former marital residence to wife, facts that
wife would be solely responsible for maintenance and upkeep on residence, would make
payments on residence, together with taxes
and insurance payments, and could make
substantial improvements to property, all
without benefit of financial help or assistance from former husband, were within
contemplation of parties, and were not compelling reasons to warrant later modification of decree.

graph 5 of the decree of divorce, taken from
the couple's settlement agreement, states
the following:
5. That plaintiff is hereby awarded all
right, title and :*iterest in and to the real
property and residence at 195 North 7th
East, . . . Subject, however, to a lien on
said premises in t*ehalf of the defendant
equal to fifty percent (5 o) of the
amours received from any sale in excess
of $17,000.00 which is th„ purchase price
of said residence. Defendant is further
awarded a first option 1 purchase said
residence in the event of nale and apply
his equity upon said p irehase price.
Plaintiff is hereby grant d the right to
reside in said residence #s long as she so
desires, but in the event of sale, the above
formula shall apply.

On November 21, 1979, defendant was
served with an order to show cause why the
original decree of divorce should not be
modified with regard to those provisions
dealing with child support and defendant's
Noali T. Woottoiv of Wootton & Wootton, \ien on the family residence. The trial
American Fork, for defendant and appel- court heard the matter on December 18,
1979, at which time plaintiff asserted that
lant.
there
had been a substantial change of cirCraig M. Snyder, Provo, for plaintiff and
cumstance
justifying modification of the
respondent.
original divorce decree relating to defendant's lien on the family residence.1 In justiHALL, Justice:
fication of this assertion, plaintiff pointed
Defendant John C. Foulger takes this ap- out that she had been making payments on
peal from an order by the trial court grant- the residence, together with tax and insuring plaintiff Heidemarie Foulger's motion ance payments thereon, since the time of
for modification of a decree of divorce. the divorce without benefit of financial help
On October 29, 1975, the lower court or assistance from defendant; that she had
granted the plaintiff a decree of divorce, been solely responsible for maintenance and
dissolving the parties' marriage of nine upkeep on the residence since the decree of
years. The parties entered into an agree- divorce was issued; that she had made subment of settlement, which was adopted by stantial improvements to the property since
the trial court Pursuant to that agree- the divorce, and contemplated further imment, and the decree based thereon, plain- provements, the effect of which would be to
tiff was awarded custody and care of the increase substantially the value of the propcouple's three minor children, alimony and erty; and that she no longer contemplated
child support payments, and a, certain poT- returning to heT native \and of Germany
tion of the marital property, including pos- with the three minor children, allegedly desession of the family residence on conditions fendant's motive for imposing the lien conwhich led to the instant dispute. Para- dition in the agreement.
1. The trial court also granted plaintiffs motion
for an increase in child support payments, from

which ruling defendant takes no appeal.
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The court found that paragraph 5 of the
original decree of divorce was "inherently
unfair" and that, the motive for the insertion thereof having been obviated, it should
be modified to grant to defendant a lien on
the family residence in <in amount equal to
one-half the appreciated value of the home,
over and above its purchi*~° price as of the
time of divorce. The purchase price of the
residence having been $17,000, and \ .iuation thereof at tue time of the divorce having been $37,000, the modification gave defendant a lien in the amount o.f $10,000.
On appeal, defendant asserts that the
modification of the decree was improper, in
that (1) plaintiff failed to show a sufficient
change in circumstances to justify modification of the decree, and (2) the property
disposition in the original decree constituted
a court^approved stipulation drafted by the
parties dealing at arm's length without duress or undue influence. We agree, and
reverse the trial court's ruling.
[1] Under Utah law, a trial court sitting
in a divorce matter retains continuing jurisdiction to make such modifications in the
initial decree of divorce as it deems just and
equitable.2 Where no appeal is taken from
the original divorce decree, however, a
change of circumstances must be shown in
order to justify a later modification of such
decree.3 Absent such a requirement, a decree of divorce would be subject to ad infinitum appellate review and readjustment according to the concepts of equity held by
succeeding trial judges.
[2] The change in circumstance required
to justify a modification of the decree of
divorce varies with the type of modification
contemplated. Provisions in the original
decree of divorce granting alimony, child
support, and the like must be readily susceptible to alteration at a later date, as the
needs which such provisions were designed
to fill are subject to rapid and unpredicta2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5, as amended.
3. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368
P.2d 264 (1962).
4. Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d
944 (1953), and cases referred to therein.

ble change. Where a disposition of real
property is in question, however, courts
should properly be more reluctant to grant
a modification. In the interest of securing
stability in titles, modifications in a decree
of divorce making disposition of real property are to be granted only upon a showing
of compelling reasons arising from a substantial and material change in circumstances.4
[3] The above holds true a fortiori
where the property disposition is the product of an agreement and stipulation between the parties, and sanctioned by the
trial court. Such a provision is the product
of an agreement bargained for by the parties. As such, a trial court should subsequently modify such a provision only with
great reluctance, and based upon compelling reasons.5
[4] In the instant case, no such compelling reasons have been shown to exist which
warrant the modification granted. Matters
such as payments on the home, and maintenance and upkeep thereof, certainly must
have been within plaintiffs contemplation
at the time she agreed to the disposition set
forth in the original divorce decree. In
regard to permanent improvements, defendant concedes that he is not entitled to
share in any increase in value resulting
therefrom, but only in the enhancement in
any increase by an accelerated economy.
The matter of plaintiff's possible departure
to Germany was, by her own admission,
never anything more than a remote possibility. The fact that she is now more established as a resident of the United States,
while it further diminishes the likelihood of
her departure, constitutes no change of circumstances sufficiently radical to justify
the trial court's action.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this
5. Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248
(1980).
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opinion. Plaintiffs prayer for attorney's
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear
their own costs.
CROCKETT,* and HOWE, J J., concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the ^ s u l t
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in
the result and dissenting):
I concur in the result, but refer to m}
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain,
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 137£
(1980).
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Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License
Division, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 16987.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 4, 1981.

The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., upheld revocation of driver's license, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oak&,
J., held that statutory "trial de novo" provided to review administrative revocation
of driver's license for refusal to submit to
blood test for alcohol content is a complete
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such
complete retrial, the Drivers License Division should have the burden of proof and
the burden of going forward with the evidence.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case prior to
his retirement.

1. Administrative Law and Procedure
e=>744
"De novo" means literally "anew,
afresh, a second time," and has at least two
possible interpretations when applied to judicial review of administrative action: (1) a
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2)
r trial upon the record made before the
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de
novo" in each statute is dictated by the
wording and context of the statute in which
it appears and by the nature of the administrative body, decision and procedure being
reviewed.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Automobiles ®=> 144.2(4)
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to
review administrative revocation of driver's
license for refusal to submit to blood test
for alcohol content is a complete retrial
upon all the evidence, and upon such complete retrial, the Drivers License Division
should have the burden of proof and the
burden of going forward with the evidence.
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.10(b).
3. Automobiles <s=> 144.2(4)
Where review of administrative revocation of driver's license for refusal to submit
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted
by erroneous ground rule about the sequence and burden of proof, Supreme Court
would not speculate about whether the error was prejudicial but would reverse and
remand the case to district court for a new
trial.

Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff,
Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant,
Respondent and Cross-Appellant.
No. 18089.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.
The First District Court, Box Elder
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted
divorce with property division, and husband
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J.,
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded
wife share in that portion of husband's
retirement benefits to which rights accrued
during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to such benefits until
he worked additional 15 years, and (2)
award of such benefits was properly made
in form of deferred distribution based upon
fixed percentage.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Divorce &=> 252.3(4)
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and
pension rights is inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject
to equitable division in divorce proceeding.
2. Divorce <s=»252.3(l, 4)
In fashioning equitable property division in divorce proceeding, court may take
into consideration all pertinent circumstances, encompassing all assets of every nature
possessed by parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived, and including retirement and pension rights;
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d
839.
3. Divorce e=» 252.3(1)
Whether resource is subject to distribution in divorce proceeding does not turn on
whether spouse can presently use or control
it, or on whether resource can be given
present dollar value; essential criterion is
656 P.2d—11

^HIBIT

whether right to benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during marriage,
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it
is subject to equitable distribution.
4. Divorce <®=»252.3(4)
In divorce proceeding, trial court properly avarci, d wife one-half share in that
portion of husband's pfovernment retirenent benefits to which rights accrued during marriage, notwithstanding that husband was not entitled to any such benefits
until and unless h-?. worked additional 15
years at government job.
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4)
Where husband's right to retirement
benefits was contingent upon his working
an additional 15 years, trial court properly
awarded wife share in such benefits in form
of deferred distribution based upon fixed
percentage.
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff,
appellant and cross-respondent.
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for defendant, respondent and cross-appellant.
DURHAM, Justice:
The plaintiff husband appeals from that
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce
which awarded to the defendant wife a
portion of his retirement benefits. The
husband argues that the court erred in considering, as a marital asset, that portion of
his pension which would be contributed by
the government at some future date.
The husband has worked as a civilian
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen
years. Under his government pension plan,
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension
fund during that time. If he were to leave
his job now, he would receive only the
amount of his contributions. In order to
receive maximum benefits from the plan,
the husband would have to participate in it
for a total of 30 years. At that time, the
government would match the amount of his
contributions and the husband could elect to
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial
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court stated that, because one-half of the
30-year period occurred during the marriage and because the wife is entitled to
one-half rtf the amount accrued during that
time, the wife was therefore "granted an
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds
which the [husband] receives on his retirement account, to be paid to [the wife] . . .
as [the husband] receives the proceeds."
The husbatid concedes that the wife is entitled to one-half of the sum he has contributed during the fifteen years of their marriage. However, he claims that she has no
right or interest in the amount to be contributes by the government at the time of
his retirement because that amount is contingent upon his continued government employment
[1,2] The only authority cited by the
husband for his position is Bennett v. Bennett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that
case, this Court reversed a trial court's division of the husband's retirement benefits
because the government's future contribution to the retirement fund was found to
have "no present value." Id. at 840. However, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308
(1982), we commented that "that holding
reflected a failure of proof," Id. The wife
urges the adoption of the position taken by
the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not
vested, represent a property interest; to
the extent that such rights derive from
employment during coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63,
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of longstanding which had distinguished pension
rights on the basis of whether the rights
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we
find it unnecessary to consider whether or
1. In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257
(1975), the court commented that "the concept
of vesting should probably find no significant
place in the developing law of equitable distribution." id at 348, 331 A.2dat262. The court
refers briefly to the origins of the vested interest as it was associated with the concept of

not the pension rights are "vested or nonvested." l In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the
family, pointing out that the court may
take into consideration all of the pertinent
circumstances. These circumstances encompass "all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained
and from whatever source derived; and
that this includes any such pension fund or
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent that
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the
ability of the court to consider all of the
parties' assets and circumstances, including
retirement and pension rights, it is expressly overruled.
[3] In the instant case, the husband argues that because he cannot now benefit
from the government's promised contributions to his pension at the time of retirement, the wife should not receive any portion of the benefits which are based on the
government's participation. This argument
fails to recognize that pension or retirement
benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the employer. If the rights to those
benefits are acquired during the marriage,
then the court must at least consider those
benefits in making an equitable distribution
of the marital assets. " 'The right to receive monies in the future is unquestionably
. . . an economic resource' subject to equitable distribution based upon proper computation of its present dollar value." Kikkert v.
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in original) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J.
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that
resource is subject to distribution does not
turn on whether the spouse can presently
use or control it, or on whether the resource
can be given a present dollar value. The
essential criterion is whether a right to the
seisin and also to its use in connection with
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional
guaranties. We agree that this concept of
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for determining what property should be subject to equitable division in a divorce proceeding.
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in
part during the marriage. To the extent
that the right has so accrued it is subject to
equitable distribution.
[4] In the instant case, the husband
must work for another fifteen years to
qualify for the maximum benefits under
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last
month. Because he must work for a total
of thirty years, his pension benefits, including any contribution by the government,
are as dependent on the first fifteen years
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is entitled to share in that portion of the benefits
to which the rights accrued during the marriage. We hold that the trial court did not
err in making equitable distribution of the
husband's retirement benefits.
[5] We also hold that the method used
to distribute the retirement benefits was a
proper exercise of the court's discretion.
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert,
supra, where it was stated:
Long-term and deferred sharing of financial interests are obviously too susceptible
to continued strife and hostility, circumstances which our courts traditionally
strive to avoid to the greatest extent
possible. This goal may be best accomplished, if a present value of the pension
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all
appropriate considerations, including the
length of time the pensioner must survive
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of
other assets leaving all pension benefits
to the employee himself.
On the other hand, where other assets
for equitable distribution are inadequate
or lacking altogether, or where no
present value can be established and the
parties are unable to reach agreement,
resort must be had to a form of deferred
distribution based upon fixed percentages.
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in
the present case present just such a circumstance: other assets available for equitable
distribution are inadequate, and a present
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-

cult if not impossible to ascertain because
the value of the benefits is contingent on
the husband's decision to remain working
for the government. In such a case, "the
trial court could use a method widely employed in other states, whereby the trial
court determines what percentage of the
marital property each spouse is to receive,
and then divides payments from the pension
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979).
The Wisconsin court continued:
Under this approach it is unnecessary to
make any determination as to the value
of the pension f u n d . . . . When the beneficiary spouse then opts to receive payments under the pension plan, the noncovered spouse would be entitled to her
established percentage of those payments . . . . Any risk associated with the
fund . . . would be by this method apportioned equally between the parties. This
method may [sic] particularly appropriate
where the present value of a pension
fund is very difficult or impossible to
assess.
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes
omitted).
The trial court awarded one-half of the
marital property to each of the parties in
the instant case. It is clear that the court
intended the wife to receive one-half of the
retirement benefits which had accrued during the fifteen-year marriage. However, in
its order, the court specified that the wife
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the
retirement plan as they are received by the
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued
during the marriage only if the husband
works for the full thirty years. The order
should be modified to provide for the wife
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued
during the marriage, regardless of the
length of time the husband continues in the
same employment. Whenever the husband
chooses to terminate his government employment, the marital property subject to
distribution is a portion of the retirement
benefits represented by the number of
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment.
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.

Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen,
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross
claims with prejudice except for claim
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city
streets in safe condition was question of
fact for jury, precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.

1. Appeal and Error ®=»430(1)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <®=>344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment <s=> 181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment <$=> 185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resolved in favor of opposing party on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.
5. Judgment <3=>180
Summary judgment is appropriate only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
6. Municipal Corporations <$=> 757(1)
City has nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe,
visible and working condition.
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cumstances under which the refusal to
grant a continuance requested on the
ground of the absence of a material witness would amount to an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion will be found
where an application for such a continuance (1) is made in good faith, (2) shows
that reasonable diligence has been exercised to obtain the presence of the witness,
(3) shows substantially to what the witness
would testify and that such testimony is
material, and (4) shows a sufficient reason
for the absence of the witness by the affidavit of an affiant in position to know the
facts. In this case, no showing was made
as to what plaintiff would testify; nor was
any affidavit filed in support of the contention that plaintiff, delayed by inclement
weather and bad roads, was on his way to
the place of trial. The record presented
here does not come close to being one
which would require this Court to find an
abuse of discretion.
The prior history of this case lends further support to the district court's decision
to dismiss for failure to prosecute; it is a
history of delay and lack of due diligence.
This is no reflection upon plaintiff's
present attorney, who did not appear on behalf of plaintiff until July of 1969. Prior
to this date, plaintiff's action had been dismissed twice. The first dismissal occurred
when plaintiff did not appear either by
counsel or in person at a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss. The second
was granted because (1) plaintiff had
failed to employ new counsel pursuant to
notice and order of the court and (2) the
matter had not been prosecuted in a timely
fashion. These facts ipay well have influenced the trial court in its decision to order the dismissal being challenged here.
The question of dismissing an action for
failure to prosecute is generally one for
the discretion of the trial court, and its
ruling will not be reversed except for manupon affidavit, the evidence which he expects to obtain; and if the adverse party
thereupon admit that such evidence would
be given, and that it be considered as ac-

ifest abuse of discretion.
Beckman v.
Beckman, supra; Hansen v. Firebaugh, supra. In light of the record presented on
appeal and the prior history of this case,
there was no abuse of discretion by the
district court.
The order of dismissal
Costs to respondent.

is

affirmed.

McQUADE, C. J., McFADDEN and
S H E P A R D , JJ., and MAYNARD, District
Judge, concur.

94 Idaho 453
Sylvester E. PEROVITZ, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
Violet E. PEROVITZ, DefendantRespondent.
No. 10350.

Supreme Court of Idaho.
Oct. 29, 1971.

Appeal by husband from an order of
the District Court, First Judicial District,
Bonner County, James G. Towles, J., modifying divorce decree and granting alimony.
The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., held that
grant to wife, in divorce decree, of husband's class " Q " allotment, as enlisted
member of the armed forces, to provide assistance to certain dependents, and of any
and all future allotments made by the husband for the use and benefit of the wife
was not an alimony award so as to entitle
the wife to modify the decree 23 years after it was entered to provide for monthly
alimony payments.
Reversed.
Spear, J., did not participate in the decision.
tually given on the trial, or offered and
overruled as improper, the trial must not
be postponed."
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1. Divorce <S=>I64

If divorce decree contains no provision
for an award of alimony, no modification
of the decree can be made once the time
for appea 1 has elapsed. I.C. § 32-706.
2. Divorce <3=>23l
"Alimony" must be awarded in the
for^ of a lump sum certain or periodic
payments of sum certain or must require
the performance of a particular act which
may be in place and stead of a particular
sum of money.

In 1953, the appellant sought a divorce
from the respondent on the ground of her
permanent and incurable insanity, which
was so certified by the superintendent of
the institution in which she was confined.
Although respondent did not appear in the
said action either in person or by counsel,
a guardian had been appointed for her and
she was represented by the prosecuting attorney of Bonner County.

The district court in the original divorce
decree awarded the custody of the minor
child of the parties to the appellant herein
3. Divorce €=? 245(1)
and the custody of the child remained in
Grant t wife, in divorce decree, of
and with the appellant until she reached
husband's ckss " Q " allotment, as enlisted
the age of majority. The record herein
member of < *e armed forces, to provide asdiscloses that the appellant herein supportsistance to certain dependents, and of any
ed the child during her minor years. The
and all future allotments made by the husoriginal divorce decree discloses that the
band for the use and benefit of the wife
only property of the parties at that time
was not an alimony award so as to entitle
was the sum of $800.00, which had been
the wife to modify the decree 23 years aftaccumulated by savings from a Class " Q "
er it was entered to provide for monthly
allotment made by the appellant from his
alimony payments. I.C. § 32-706; 10 U.S.
pay in the armed forces. The trial court
C.A. § 894.
awarded that property to the respondent
herein.
Stephen Bistline, Sandpoint, for plaintiff-appellant.
Everett D. Hofmeister, Lyons & Hofmeister, Sandpoint, for defendant-respondent.
S H E P A R D , Justice.
This case is an appeal from an order
modifying a divorce decree to grant the respondent former wife $50.00 per month as
alimony. We everse the order of the district court.
Appellant and respondent were married
in 1945. Appellant then, and for many
years thereafter, was an enlisted man in
the armed forces. Respondent was a native of India, where the parties were married. A child was born the issue of that
marriage in 1946. During 1948, respondent
developed a mental illness and was confined in a state mental institution in Minnesota. The last time that appellant saw
respondent was in the year 1950.
490 P.2d—21

The only question for resolution herein
is the effect of that portion of the original
divorce decree which states:
" * * * and is further awarded, for
the use and benefit of the defendant [respondent], the proceeds of any and all
future allotment or allotments made by
the plaintiff for the use and benefit of
Violet E. Perovitz."
(Emphasis supplied)
By 1966, the respondent had recovered
from her mental illness and entered a motion to amend the original divorce decree
therein asking for $600.00 per year back
alimony and $300.00 per month future alimony. Respondent's theory here and in
the court below was that the above quoted
portion of the original divorce decree constituted an award of alimony.
Appellant appeared specially and moved
to quash the motion for modification. He
contends that the district court had no jurisdiction to modify the original divorce
decree by granting alimony since the above
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quoted portion of the decree did not constitute an award of alimony.
After hearing on the motion for modification, the court below ordered that the decree of divorce be modified and that respondent be granted $50.00 per month future alimony, but that she recover nothing
by way of past alimony.
[1] LC. § 32-706 authorizes the award
of alimony in the discretion of the district
court and alimony may also be awarded
when a divorce has been secured on the
ground of permanent and incurable insanity, I.C. § 32-804. I.C. § 32-706 authorizes
the modification of a divorce decree from
time to time, but if the decree contains no
provision for an award of alimony, no
modification of the decree can be made
once the time for appeal has elapsed.
McDonald v. McDonald, 56 Idaho 444, 457,
55 P.2d 827 (1936); Jordan v. Jordan, 87
Idaho 432, 437, 394 P.2d 163 (1964). Obviously then, the above cited language of
the decree is determinative as to the result
herein.

construed "alimony." It is implicit that
"alimony" must in any event be awarded in
the form of a lump sum certain or periodic
payments of sums certain or require the
performance of a particular act which may
be in place and stead of a pi^icular sum
of money, such as the purchase of insurance in a certain amount. 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 235.
Following the heai'ng on the motion for
modification, the trial court held that the
grant of a "Class *Q' " allotment in the original divorce decree constituted an alinu ny
award. Such conclusion on, the part of the
trial court is not supportable in consideration of the federal statutes governing and
authorizing the making of allotmer s by
personnel of the armed services. A Class
"Q" allotment may be made by an enlisted
member of the armed services to provide
assistance to "certain dependents." 10 U.
S.C.A. § 894 (1927); 32 C.F.R., Ch. 5,
Part 538 (Revised 1954). The statutes
further provide that dependents include
wives or children, and further provide
that any such allotment must cease at
the time that the relationship of the husband and wife ceases. The ability of the
appellant to allot and the ability of the
respondent to receive any allotment terminated at the time of the divorce decree. It was beyond the power of the trial
court to provide for or require the payment
of an allotment after the parties were divorced, since such action was and is contrary to the federal statute. The above
cited statutes also authorize the making
of a Class "E" allotment to a divorced
wife, but such is a purely voluntary art
on the serviceman's part. 32 C.F.R., Ch.
5, Part 538.

[2] We note initially that the language
sought to be interpreted as awarding alimony is in fact no award of any specific
sum. Further, there is no time certain at
which or within which any specific sum of
money must be paid. In fact, the language
used would seem to connote that the appellant may voluntarily make some payment
in the future of some indeterminate
amount of money for the use and benefit
of the respondent. It is obvious that no
action could be brought by way of contempt or otherwise to have forced appellant to make any payment of any sum under the authority of the above cited language of the decree. While there appears
[3] At trial the uncontroverted testimoto be some split of authority as to whether
a court may award alimony in the form of ny of the appellant discloses that appellant
periodic monthly payments or may require and respondent lived together as husband
a lump sum payment as and for alimony, it and wife less than three years. The child
is clear that in Idaho either alternative of the parties was supported entirely by
may be utilized. Enders v. Enders, 36 Ida- the appellant until she reached the age of
ho 481, 211 P. 549 (1922). Respondent has majority. Appellant has remarried and has
cited no authority to the effect that lan- two minor children. He is employed and
guage as used in the case at bar is to be his net take-home pay is approximately
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$101.00 per week, He and his present
family live modestly in a small home and
his entire income is necessary to the support of his present family. After 23 years,
this ghost from the past has arisen to
haunt and make demands upon her former
husband for alimony. It is the opinion of
this Court that the decision of the court
below serves no societal interest, and in
any event, since the original divorce decree
was devoid of any alimony award, the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to modify the original divorce decree
to award alimony.
The decision of the lower court is reversed. Costs to appellant.
McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN and
DONALDSON, JJ., concur.
SPEAR, J., sat but retired prior to decision.

94 Idaho 456
The STATE of Idaho ex rel. R. Doyle
SYMMS et al., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
V - I OIL COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
Nos. 10580, 10829.

Supreme Court of Idaho.
Nov. 4, 1971.

Appeal by condemnor from award entered in the Sixth Judicial District Court,
Bannock County, Gus Carr Anderson, J.,
in action for condemnation of real property for highway construction. The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., held that where
condemnor learned, during pendency of appeal from award to condemnee who had
testified that profit at gas station on lot to
be condemned had been in excess of
$18,000 per year for previous two years
and that there had been few "gas wars",
that condemnee, approximately one year

prior to trial, had filed federal action in
Utah alleging improper competition, that
he had incurred substantial losses ranging
between $5,000 and $8,000 per year at his
gas station site and that "gas wars" had
been in existence between 80 and 90% of
the time during period involved, condemnor was entitled to new trial on ground of
fraud or misrepresentation.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Spear, J., sat but retired prior to decision.
I. Judgment <§=>376

Where condemnor learned, during pendency of appeal from award to condemnee
who had testified that profit at gas station
on lot to be condemned had been in excess
of $18,000 per year for previous two years
and that there had been few "gas wars,"
that condemnee, approximately one year
prior to trial, had filed federal action in
Utah alleging improper competition, that
he had incurred substantial losses ranging
between $5,000 and §8y000 per year at his
gas station site and that "gas wars" had
been in existence between 80 and 90% of
the time during period involved, condemnor was entitled to vacation of judgment
and new trial on ground of fraud or misrepresentation. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
60(b).
2. Eminent Domain <§=>202(4)

Testimony regarding profits
from
business conducted upon property sought to
be condemned is not ordinarily admissible
except in most unusual cases.
3. Eminent Domain <S=s202(4)

Where condemnor in eminent domain
action for condemnation of real property
for highway construction was merely condemning parcel of land and not business
located thereon, direct testimony concerning past profits from going business conducted on land sought to be condemned
was not admissible.
4. Eminent Domain <§=>2I9

Condemnor which raised but one
objection to entire line of questioning of
condemnee concerning profits of business
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act or conduct of the defendants. They divorce action was an award for support
have done nothing to invoke an estoppel and maintenance of the wife "in the nature
against them.
of alimony" which was not dischargeable
[2] Therefore, we conclude that since on the husband's bankruptcy. Bankr.Act,
the plaintiffs lien expired while this ac- § 17, 11 U.S.CA. § 35.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
tion was pending in the district court, the
Edition, for other judicial constructions
estate was distributed to Harry Walker
and definitions of "In the Nature of Alifree of any lien arising by virtue of the
mony".
plaintiff's judgment.
The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded with directions that the plaintiff's complaint be
dismissed and that a decree be entered
quieting title to the property in Harry
Walker, free of any liens held against it
by the plaintiff. Appellants to recover
their costs.

4. Bankruptcy <S=J42I(5)

Where it was alleged that effect of
original divorce decree was to provide for
a property settlement and not for alimony,
and trial court thereafter determined that
such award was a property settlement and
hence beyond its power to amend after expiration of the interlocutory period, whether the award was "in the nature of alimony"
PRATT, C. J., and L A T I M E R and Mc- and not dischargeable on the husband's
DONOUGH, JJ., concur.
bankruptcy was not res judicata. Bankr.
Act, § 17, 11 U.S.CA. § 35; U.CA.1943,
W A D E , J., concurs in the result
§ 40—3—5.

Appeal from District Court, Fourth District, Utah County; William Stanley Dunford, Judge.

LYON v. LYON.
No. 7229.

Supreme Court of titan*
May 16, 1949.

Action by Florence Clara Lyon against
Myron B. Lyon to recover payments in
accordance with a prior decree of divorce
rendered between the parties. From the
judgment, defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed.

Christenson & Christenson, Provo, for
1. Bankruptcy <§=433(7)
appellant
Courts will look behind a judgment
J. Rulon Morgan, Elias Hansen, Salt
to ascertain whether the obligation which
Lake
City, for respondent.
was merged in the judgment is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
W O L F E , Justice.
2. Bankruptcy <§=»436(2)
Appeal by the defendant from a judgEvidence of conversations between ment of the Fourth District Court in favor
parties leading up to written stipulation of the plaintiff for $2,750 and adjudging
upon which "property settlement ,, provided the enforceability of future payments to
for in divorce decree was based was admis- plaintiff in accordance with a prior decree
sible in order to ascertain whether obliga- of divorce rendered between the parties
tion represented thereby was merged in herein. It is necessary to a proper underjudgment against defendant which was standing of the case that the background
dischargeable on his bankruptcy. Bankr. and surrounding facts be related in some
Act, § 1 et seq., 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. detail.
3. Bankruptcy <§=»436(3)
For some twenty-two years prior to 1945
Evidence established that a property plaintiff and defendant had lived together
settlement between husband and wife in as husband and wife. In that year, plain-
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tiff commenced an action for divorce
against defendant, and in her complaint
she alleged that they had "agreed upon a
property settlement"
(italics added) and
prayed that she "be awarded a property
settlement" (italics added), and for general
relief. There was no prayer for alimony.
On the same day that the complaint was
verified, the parties entered into a written
stipulation for a judgment of $5,000 payable $50 or more per month; and providing
for payment by defendant of a mortgage
on certain land in Indiana owned by the
parties; and that defendant carry a $5,000
life insurance policy naming plaintiff as
beneficiary, until the $5,000 judgment and
the mortgage were fully paid. After hearing, the court concluded that plaintiff was
''entitled to a property settlement as set
forth in the stipulation," and entered a
decree substantially incorporating the provisions of the stipulation. At no place in
the pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions
of law, or decree did the words "alimony"
or "support money" appear. All references
to the money judgment and other provisions
of the decree relating to the financial obligations of the defendant to plaintiff were in
the terms of "property settlement."

Utah

l£9

"It is now ordered and adjudged: that
the said petition be, and the same is hereby, dismissed."
In 1947 defendant was adjudged a bankrupt, and was discharged from all claims,
and debts except such as are excepted from
discharge by the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.
C.A. § 1 et seq.
Subsequent thereto, and on petition of
plaintiff, the district court (of Utah) issued
an order to show cause why the amount
due plaintiff under the divorce decree
should not be fixed, and why defendant
should not deliver to plaintiff a life insurance policy for $5,000 with plaintiff as
beneficiary, and why defendant should not
be punished for contempt. Defendant answered, pleading his discharge in bankruptcy. After hearing on the order to
show cause, the court held that defendant's
obligations under the divorce decree were
not discharged in bankruptcy, and entered
judgment against defendant for $2750 as
accrued payments and for costs. Defendant was found not in contempt. From that
judgment defendant appeals.
The ultimate question to be determined
is whether the unpaid financial obligations
of the defendant to the plaintiff under the
decree of divorce were discharged in bankruptcy, or stated differently, whether the
divorce decree comes within the provisions
of that portion of the Bankruptcy Act
which reads as follows:
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
except * * * for alimony due or to
become due, or for maintenance or support
of wife or child * * *." 11 U.S.C.A.
§35.

Some months later, and after the expiration of the interlocutory period, defendant
filed a petition for modification of the
divorce decree by way of reduction in the
amount of the monthly payments ordered
by the decree of the court. Plaintiff resisted the granting of the petition by demurrer, motion, and answer, asserting that
the decree provided for a property settlement, and not for alimony, and therefore
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court
to modify. Plaintiff's general demurrer to
the petition was sustained, and defendant
having failed to amend within the time
Defendant has set forth 29 assignments
allowed, the petition was dismissed on of error, but many of these go to the same
motion of plaintiff. The order of dismissal question or questions, and they may be
reads in part as follows:
consolidated for convenience of discussion.
"And the court having determined that
Before consideration of the legal questhe provisions in the decree of divorce tions involved, it should be further observed
herein, of which modification is sought by that at the hearing on the order to show
said petition, are not orders for the pay?nent cause, the court admitted in evidence, over
cf alimony but are accrued and vested the objection of the defendant, testimony
judgments which this court has no juris- as to the conversations between the plaindiction to modify by reason of changed tiff and defendant leading up to the written
conditions;
stipulation upon which the decree was
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based. That testimony was to the effect
that prior to the divorce the parties had
jointly owned an equity in a home in
Indiana, but before the divorce that home
was placed in the wife's name alone; that
at the time the written stipulation was
signed, it was understood between the parties that the $5,000 was for her support
and maintenance, and the payments on the
house mortgage were for the same purpose,
and that the insurance was to assure her
at least $5,000 for the same purpose. On
cross-examination plaintiff testified that in
addition to their home, the parties owned,
at the time of their divorce, certain antiques, household furniture, $2,700 in cash,
an automobile, and some war bonds. Prior
to her marriage to defendant, plaintiff had
had experience as a stenographer, music
instructor, and a buyer.
Defendant testified that prior to the divorce plaintiff had set $5,000 as the price
for defendant's freedom. He further testified as to certain jewelry owned by plaintiff at the time of the divorce. Of all the
personal property owned by the parties at
the time of the divorce, defendant kept the
car (equity worth about $350), his personal
clothing, and a part of the furniture, and
plaintiff received all the rest. Defendant
further testified that at no time in connection with the stipulation was there any mention of alimony, it being always referred
to as a property settlement; that plaintiff
would say she didn't want to be left penniless; that she said she wanted "her share",
and that she was entitled to that much and
if he wanted his freedom from her she
would have to have that amount.
Defendant further testified that his annual gross income from his employment
at Geneva Steel Company was $7,000 per
year, and that he had been continually
employed there from a time prior to the
divorce up to the time of hearing except
for a period from October, 1945, to July,
1946, when operations had been shut down.
From January to June of 1946, defendant
had been employed by another steel company in Gary, Indiana.
The basis of the decision below is
revealed in a well considered memorandum
decision written by the trial judge, and

although it constitutes no part of the record
before us, it has been of material assistance to us in reaching a decision in this
case. The trial court took the view that
even though the divorce decree provided
for a property settlement, such property
settlement was "in the nature of alimony"
and therefore the obligation thereunder
was not discharged in bankruptcy. In this
connection it must be noted that it is not
just alimony in its conventional form (viz.,
monthly payments to a wife) which is
excluded from the provisions for discharge
of debts. All obligations "for maintenance
or support of wife or child," whether
denominated alimony by the state statute
or not, are such as are not dischargeable
in bankruptcy. It follows, therefore, that
the real issue in this case is not, as the
parties have argued, whether the award of
the divorce decree was alimony or a property settlement, but rather whether the
"property settlement" was really an award
for the support and maintenance of defendant's wife.
In his memorandum decision, after
pointing out that of the $7800 worth of
real and personal property owned by the
parties at the time of the divorce, plaintiff
received more than $7,300 worth and defendant received only about $460 worth,,
the trial judge clearly stated his reasons
for holding that the property settlement
was "in the nature of alimony" in the
following language:
"Divisions of property between divorce
litigants are not ordinarily made upon a
basis 1/16 to the husband and 15/16 to the
wife. Yet that is the approximate ratio of
the division in this stipulation. The right
in lieu of dower in Utah is only one-third tothe wife. Strict divisions of property have
gone as high as one-half each. Thus,
looking behind the decree and the stipulation, the conclusion seems inescapable
under the authorities cited that much of
the property awarded, without regard to
the order for payment of the mortgage
upon the home, or the judgment for $5000,.
or the order for maintenance of the insurance protection, was 'in the nature of
alimony,' and designed and contemplated
by the parties to be for the support and
maintenance of the plaintiff.
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'Such a conclusion is further supported
by consideration of the years that the parties maintained the domestic relationship,
by the fact that she was a stenographer
a n d self-sustaining before marriage, that
she is now 56 years old and thus practically
unemployable in her profession, and by
her positive testimony that in the attorney's office at the time of drawing the
stipulation the payments of money were
referred to as being for her support and
maintenance, and by the defendant's admission that support and maintenance of the
plaintiff was discussed there."
In attacking the judgment, defendant
first asserts that the court erred in receiving evidence of conversations between the
parties leading up to the written stipulation
upon which the "property settlement" provided for in the divorce decree was based;
that the trial court erred in receiving
evidence as to the disposition by the parties
of personal property not mentioned in the
stipulation or decree; and that it was error
for the trial court to go behind the divorce
decree to determine the nature of the
award therein provided.

had been merged in judgments or into
written contracts. The court did not err
in receiving extrinsic evidence to show the
true nature of the obligation of defendant
td plaintiff.

[3] Defendant next contends that even
though the court did not err in receiving
extrinsic evidence a to the nature of
award provided for by the divorce d :ree,
such evidence did not justify the hjiding
that the award was "in the mature of
alimony." With this contention we cannot
agree. As pointed out in the m u ' orandum
decision of the trial court, a property
settlement of 15/16 in favor of le wife
and 1/16 to the husband is highly unusual.
The wife was well past middle age and
could not reasonably expect to uad employment of the type for which she had been
trained. The fact that the husband was
to pay off the mortgage on the home, that
he was to pay the alimony in gross in
monthly installments of $50, that he was
to carry insurance on his own life with
his former wife as beneficiary, and that
she received nearly all of the household
furniture, all point to the idea of support.
[1,2] It may be true, as contended by The evidence adequately supports the finddefendant, that as a general rule a trial ings and holdings of the trial court.
court will not look behind a judgment or
[4] It is next argued by defendant
decree to determine the nature thereof,
that
the question is res judicata. Counsel
unless it is so ambiguous or uncertain that
extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain contends that the effect of the original diit. However, plaintiff has cited to us a vorce decree was to pronounce a property
number of cases holding that courts will settlement; that it did not provide for alilook behind the judgment to ascertain mony; that the court having thereafter dewhether the obligation which was merged termined that such award was a property
in the judgment was dischargeable in bank- settlement and hence beyond the power of
ruptcy. See in re Williams, 208 N.Y. 32, the court to amend after the expiration of
101 N.E. 853, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 719; Green the interlocutory period, they co d not
v. Beaumont, 179 Ga. 804, 177 S.E. 572; now re-examine the same question - nd hold
Bever v. Swecker, 138 Iowa 721, 116 N.W. that the award was "in the natur* of ali704; Taylor v. Buser, 167 N.Y.S. 887; mony."
Smith v. Smith, D.C., 7 F.Supp. 490; and
The issue determined on the petition for
2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., 1176, modification of the divorce decree was not
2349, Sections 552, 1128. We have dis- the same issue as the one now confronting
covered no authority to the contrary. The us. The issue in the former proceeding
rule announced in the cas'es and texts was whether the award was of such nature
above cited is reasonable and necessary to that it could be modified under Sec. 40—
give full effect to the legislative intent. 3—5, U.C.A.1943. The question now beOtherwise, many obligations intended to fore us is whether the award was of such
be excepted from the discharge provisions nature as to be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
of the Bankruptcy Act might neverthe- Defendant concedes "that the mere fact
less become discharged simply because they that a judgment may not be modified by
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the court does not render the same dischargeable in bankruptcy * * *. The
character of the liability is the controlling
matter, not "imply the incidents with respect to finally or modification, although
they may be indicative as to such character."
The ruling upon the demurrer to the
petir^n for modification in the court below
and the subseq .nt order of dismissal on
failure of petitioner to plead over, are not
inconsistent vith the subsequent ruling of
the court 01 the question of discharge in
bankruptcy. The ruling on the demurrer
to the petition for modification and the
order of dis lissal of the petition were
based upon t \ e ground that the agreement
incorporated in the divorce decree provided for a judgment in a definite sum,
namely $5,000, although * payable over a
period of years at the rate of $50 per
month. The court reached the conclusion,
as evidenced by the order of dismissal of
the petition to modify, that this judgment
was not subject to modification by the
court. There is not necessarily implicit in
such ruling a holding that the contract
incorporated in the divorce decree constituted a property settlement rather than a
provision for the payments in the nature
of support money.
In its subsequent ruling on the question
of discharge in bankruptcy, the court held
in effect that the monthly payments provided for in the decree were in the nature
of support money and hence not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
It does not necessarily follow, because a
decree such as t h ' t before us is not subject
to modification assuming for the purpose
of this decision chat the court was correct
in so holding), -hat the payments provided
in such decree are not in the nature of
support money within the -intendment of
the Federal Bankruptcy laws. Hence the
ruling on the petition to modify was not
properly pleadable as res judicata of the
question involved in the subsequent proceedings in the order to show cause.

owing to the wife in lieu of support, and
further providing that the unpaid portion
would upon her death pass to her estate,
was exempt from a discharge in bankruptcy even though the agreement was
that the plaintiff would relinquish her claim
for support and maintenance if the defendant would pay her the $60,000 he owed her
because of advances made to him in furtherance of his career. The court said
"in a sense it involved a contract for the
maintenance or support of the plaintiff
since the defendant, in making payment of
the debt, would be released also from that
obligation/' In short, the debt was by the
agreement of the parties "converted intoa contract 'for the maintenance and support
of wife' within the purview of section 17
of the Bankruptcy Act."
The judgment in the D'Andria case was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New
York, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N„E.2d 294.
It seems clear that the agreement construed by the New York court would not
be subject to modification, in a court
proceeding instituted for such purpose.
However, this fact did not preclude a
holding that the agreement did provide for
payments in the nature of support money
and hence the obligation was not dischargeable in bankruptcy. True, in that case
the court was not confronted with a plea of
res judicata. But the opinion clearly reveals that had there been an adverse ruling
on a petition to modify prior to the decision in the case in question, the same result
relative to discharge in bankruptcy would
have been reached.

Defendant has argued that if we should
hold, as we do, that the award of the
divorce decree was not dischargeable in
bankruptcy, we should further hold that
the trial court could entertain a petition
for modification of the decree, and upon a
proper showing of change of circumstances,
should order a modification. The question
of whether the award of the decree was
one which could be modified on a petition
for modification, has not been, by appropriIn D'Andria v. Hageman, 253 App.Div. ate assignment of error and argument in
518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835, it was held that the printed briefs, presented to us for
an agreement for the payment of a debt decision, and hence, as to that question we

SLATER v. SAL1,T LAKE CITY
C i t e a«
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c x press no opinion, except as to the implications of the discussion on the conclusiveness of the judgment of dismissal for
failure to amend the petition for modification may throw light on said question.
The judgment is affirmed^ Costs i. respondent.
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5. Commerce €=48

Control of traffic on city streets under
city ordinance does not materially obstruct
free flow of commerce in violation of commerce clause of federal Constitution, and
amount of any increase in burden imposed
on such commerce by ordinance is inconsequential.

PRATT, C. J., and W A D E , L A T I M h . l ,
6. Commerce €=48
and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
Gi .at leeway is allowed local authorities in controlling pedestrians and use of
sidewalks, in absence of conflicting federal
( O I KEt MUMBIR StSTEM>
regulation, though local regulations materic j y intei fere with interstate commerce.

SLATER v. SALT LAKE CITY et al.
No. 7222.

Supreme Court of Utah.
May 14, 1949.

7. Constitutional law €=90
A city ordinance, prohibiting sale of
rragazine subscriptions on certain streets
in congested business district of city is not
unconstitutional as abridging or infringing
freedom of speech.

8. Constitutional law €=90
The constitutional right to 'freedom of
t. Appeal and error €=917(1)
On appeal from judgment of dismissal, speech is subject to reasonable regulation.
founded on ruling sustaining general de- 9. Constitutional law €=90
murrer to complaint, Supreme Court must
The right of free speech cannot be
accept allegations of facts in complaint as used to protect commercial activities cartrue.
ried on in streets or on sidewalks.
2. Commerce €=12
10. Appeal and error €=837(1)
Largely local matters can be dealt with
City ordinances, not pleaded by appelby state, though regulations thereof inter- lant in court below, are not properly before
fere in some degree with free flow of in- Supreme Court for consideration in supterstate commerce.
port of appellant's argument as to construc3. Commerce €=55
A city ordinance prohibiting sale of
magazine subscriptions on streets in congested business district deals with largely
local matter of retaining sidewalks for intended use by pedestrians, and hence is not
unconstitutional as imposing burden on interstate commerce.

tion and unconstitutionality of another such
ordinance.
11. Evidence €=32
The Supreme Court does not take judicial r >tice of municipal ordinances. 1
12. Ev dence €=20(1)
It is common knowledge that selling of
newspapers, religious literature and imitation poppies and forget-me-nots is carried
on in business district of Salt Lake City.

4. Commerce €=48
Municipal corporations €=703(1)
The right to regulate traffic on streets
and sidewalks is within powers delegated 13. Constitutional law €=208(1)
Discrimination is essence of classificato city by state, and reasonable restrictions
thereon do not offend against commerce tion by statute and violates constitution
only when founded on unreasonable basis. 2
clause of -federal Constitution.
1 State v. Butcher, 74 Utah 275, 279
P. 497.
2 State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d
920, 117 A L.R. 330; Broadbent v. Gib20G P.2d—10^i

son, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939; Wallberg v. Utah Public Welfare Comm.,
Utah, 203 P.2d 935.
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Verla H. CARTER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Gerald W. CARTER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14554.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 5, 1977.
Husband appealed from order of the
Fifth District Court, Juab County, J. Harlan Burns, J., which denied his motion to
reduce alimony payments. The Supreme
Court, Crockett, J., held that: (1) it was
proper for trial court to ask husband, who
claimed reduction in earning capacity,
whether he had testified in another case
that he was a competent cattleman; and (2)
fact that husband had been in good health
and earning $21,000 per year in construction work at the time of initial decree but
had suffered an impairment of health which
reduced his earning capacity to $10,000 to
$12,000 per year and that husband had remarried did not entitle husband to reduction alimony from $200 per month to $100
per month.
Affirmed.
1. Evidence <s=>43(3), 51
Notice may be taken of the record of
another case but, for that to be done, it
should be so offered in evidence by a party
or so stated by the trial court so that it will
be known to them what is being relied
upon.

tent cattleman; there was nothing improper in the trial court's asking the question.
4. Judges <3=*49(1)
Fact that trial judge had prior knowledge of testimony given by husband in a
prior case did not indicate any prejudice
against the husband.
5. T /orce <£=>240(2)
Amount of alimony to be paid by husband need not be correlated in percentage
to husband's income; earning capacity and
income a**e important factors to be consit iered but they are only part of the total
cv cumstances to be considered as to what is
appropriate and equitable.
6. Divorce <s= 240(2)
One major factor to be considered in
determining the amount of alimony are the
wife's needs and requirements.
7. Divorce <®=> 245(2)
Fact that husband had remarried and
that, although he was in good health and
earning approximately $21,000 per year in
construction work at the time that alimony
was initially set at $200 per month, his
health had deteriorated so that he was able
to do only less strenuous work and had an
earning capacity of only $10,000 to $12,000
per year did not entitle husband to reduction in alimony payments from $200 per
month to $100 per month.
8. Divorce ®=> 245(2)
Subsequent obligations voluntarily acquired do not generally reduce obligations
to make alimony payments under prior divorce decree.

2. Witnesses <s=* 379(1, 8)
Witness may be cross-examined on the
basis of statements or representations properly imputed to him on any prior occasion,
including another trial.

9. Divorce <s=> 245(3)
Burden of persuading trial court that
there has been such a change in circumstances as to justify reduction in amount of
alimony payable by husband rests upon the
husband.

3. Witnesses e=> 246(2), 379(8)
It was proper to ask husband, who
claimed diminution in earning capacity and
ability to pay alimony, whether he had testified in another case that he was a compe- '

10. Divorce <s=> 184(5, 10)
Same rules of review apply in supplementary proceedings as to original divorce
matters; reviewing court surveys the record in the light favorable to the findings
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and determination made by the trial court
and does not interfere therewith unless it
appears that the evidence clearly preponderates against th°. trial court'0 findings or
that the trial court has abused its discretion.
Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for defendant and appellant.
Dave McMullin, Pavson, for plaintiff and
respondent.
CROCKETT, Justin:
Defendant Gerald W. Carter appeals
from the refusal of the District Court to
reduce his alimony payments to plaintiff
Verla H. Carter from $200 per month, as
provided in the divorce decree herein, to
$100 per month.
The divorce was granted to plaintiff in
June of 1973. She was awarded custody of
the only child, with $60 per month support,
and $200 per month alimony.
The position essayed by the defendant is
that there has been a substantial change in
circumstances: that whereas he was then in
good health and earning about $21,000 per
year in construction work, his health is now
impaired so he has to do less strenuous
work, which has reduced his earning capacity to $10,000 to $12,000 per year; and that
he has increased financial obligations due to
his remarriage.
[1, 2] Prefatory to addressing the principal problem, we direct attention to an attack the defendant makes upon the evidence. He argues that the trial judge improperly considered testimony given by the
defendant in a prior unrelated case in which
the trial judge presided. It is true that
notice may be taken of the record of another case. 1 But for this to be done it should
1.

Pierpont v Hydro Manufacturing
Anz.App 252, 526 P2d 776 (1974)

Co,

2.

See State in Interest of Hales, 538 P 2d 1034
(Utah 1975), requiring such a procedure, as
stated by Justice Ellett for a unanimous court
"In any case the court should not take notice
sua sponte of the proceedings in another case

be so offered in evidence by a party, or so
stated by the trial court, so that it will be
known to them what is being relied on.2
However, this does not preclude the crossexamination of a witness on the basis of
statements or representations properly imputed to him on any prior occasion, including another trial.3
[3,4] In connection with defendant's
testimony herein concerning his earning capacity, the trial judge himself asked the
defendant if he had not testified in the
other case that he was a competent cattleman. This was a legitimate question to be
asked as probative on the defendant's earning capacity and thus as to his ability to pay
alimony. It therefore could have been
asked by counsel; and there was nothing
improper in the trial court asking if he
thought the pursuit of truth so required.
Neither does the fact that the trial judge
had this prior knowledge, ipso facto, indicate any prejudice against the defendant.
The latter was fully aware that the judge
had presided in the prior proceeding; and if
he had thought any prejudice existed, he
should have taken timely and appropriate
action with respect thereto.
[5-7] In regard to the major problem:
the defendant's argument that the evidence
compels a reduction in the alimony payment
from $200 to $100 per month. He is mistaken in his assumption that the amount of
alimony payable should be correlated in
percentage to his income, to be scaled up or
down as his income may vary. His earning
capacity and his income are, of course, important factors to be considered. But that
is only part of the total circumstances to be
considered as to what is appropriate and
equitable Another major one is what are
plaintiff's needs and requirements;4 and

22

unless the files of the other case are placed in
evidence in the matter before the court '
3.
4.

31A C J S Evidence § 299
Lambert \ Lambert, 66 Wash 2d 503, 403
P2d 664 (1965), Gordon v Gordon, 44
Wash 2d 222, 266 P 2d 786 (1954), Hendncks
v Hendncks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P 2d 277 (1936),
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there is no showing that there has been any
decrease therein.
[8] A similar observation applies to the
defendant's contention that added financial
obligations resulting from his remarriage
should redound to his benefit herein. It is
usually said that subsequent obligations voluntarily acquired should not reduce obligations under a prior divorce decree. While
this is the primary and fundamental rule, it
is likewise not absolute, but is still another
factor which may be considered in determining what is equitable and practical under the total circumstances.5
[9,10] As opposed to defendant's insistence that the trial court should have modified the decree, it is appropriate to have in
mind that the burden of persuading the
trial court that there has been such a
change in circumstances as to justify such
modification rests upon him; 6 and that the
same rules of review apply in supplementary proceedings, as in original divorce matters; that is, that we survey the record in
the light favorable to the findings and determination made by the trial court; and
that we do not interfere therewith unless it
appears that the evidence clearly preponderates against his findings or that he
abused his discretion.7
Upon the basis of what has been said
herein, we are not persuaded that the ruling of the trial court should be overturned.
Costs to plaintiff (respondent).

Drew JENSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Steve BAUGHMAN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14547.
Supreme CouK of Utah.
April 6, 1977.
Defendant appealed from an order of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Marcellus K. Snow, J., grantin[ plaintiff's
motion to vacate a prior dis nissal with
prejudice for failure to answer interrogatories. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held
that: (1) order of district judge granting
motion to vacate a prior dismissal of complaint with prejudice for failure to answer
interrogatories was not objectionable as reversing or altering the order of a fellow
district judge, since prior order of dismissal
of other judge was only in "contemplation"
of plaintiff's possible failure to provide answers to interrogatories within 15 days permitted so that such order was never operable; and that (2) record established that
court did not abuse its discretion in granting motion to vacate order of dismissal with
prejudice for failure to answer interrogatories on alleged ground that order had been
obtained ex parte after assurance of plaintiff's counsel that additional time would be
afforded to file the answers.
Judgment affirmed.

ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur.

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419

6.

Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021
(1970); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 20 Utah 2d 360,
438 P.2d 180 (1968).

24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce & Separation Section
689; Reed v. Reed, 128 Cal.App.2d 786, 276
P.2d 36 (1955).

7.

Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974).

Hampton
(1935).
5.

1. Judges <s=>24
Order of district judge grar ting motion
to vacate a prior dismissal of complaint
with prejudice for failure to answer interrogatories was not objectionable as reversing or altering the order of a fellow district
judge, since prior order of dismissal of other
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sign to kill "must precede the killing by
some appreciable space of time, but the
time need not be long" and again that it
"need only be long enough for some reflection and consideration.
It involves a
choice to act or not when the time is sufficient for this, it does not matter how brief
it is."
[2] Defendant relies heavily on State
v. Anselmo, 5 which we believe to be inapropos here because in that case the instruction provided that there need be no
appreciable time between intent and act
and that it could be instantaneous, whereas
in the instant case the court instructed that
the intent to kill must have been formed
before the blow was struck and "must precede the killing by some appreciable space
of time," and that "in the commission of
the offense 'deliberate' means in a self-controlled state and not in a sudden passion"
and that it connotes a weighing of motives,
its consequences, its nature and all other
circumstances. The distinction is obvious,
and anyway, we think the case of State v.
Warwick 6 is dispositive on this point.

to believe. The error complained of is
technical at best under the admitted and
other facts adduced, and at best we believe
that conceding the instruction may have
been erroneous, it was not prejudicial.
[4] As to 4) : That the court erred in
allowing the prosecution to question defendant as to his right to remain silent
while under custodial interrogation: It appears that defendant was given the Miranda warning at time of arrest, and again
when questioned by a detective, after
which he admitted the offense, took the
former to the scene and helped in a search
for empty shells. At no time did he claim
self-defense until trial, when he did, resulting in his cross-examination for impeachment purposes. We think that no prejudicial error was committed here. (All emphasis added.)
CALLISTER, C. J., and T U C K E T T and
E L L E T T , J J., concur.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the result.

[3] As to 3) : As to one striking the
first blow being entitled to claim self-defense and an instruction thereon: The
trial court instructed on self-defense in
words substantially as found in the justifiable homicide statute (Title 76-30-10, Utah
Code Annotated 1953), except that the instruction in stating the rights and duties of
one attacking, used the words "original assailant" while the statute stated "assailant."
The defendant says the difference is prejudicial as giving the jury the impression
that an "original assailant" could never
have a claim of self-defense. The difficulty is that the defendant here shot first
and was the "original assailant" and we
discern no facts reflected in the record
that could be interpreted that he acquired a
claim of self-defense thereof save his own
self-serving gratuity that the victim drew
first, a fact that is not otherwise supported,—a fact that the jury need not have had

From a judgment of the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall,
J., reducing alimony award, an appeal was
taken. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J.,
held that it was immaterial that divorced
husband had since married a woman with a
child.
Remanded for new trial.

5. 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915).

6. 11 Utah 2d 116. 333 P.2d 703 (I960).
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27 Utah 2d 103
Lee C. FELT, aka Lee Craig Felt,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Robert S. FELT, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 12409.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Feb. 1, 1072.
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1. Divorce 0 2 4 5 ( 3 )

Divorced husband, moving to delete alimony provision of divorce decree, had
burden of proving change of circumstances
warranting modification; and, on record
presented, burden was not borne with such
substantiality as to warrant emasculation
of $12,000 award of alimony except for token annual $1.
2. Divorce <§=>247

Evidence that his counsel had advised
him to sign agreement under which divorced wife accepted alimony in specified
amount on condition that she could supplement it with other income was not pertinent to divorced husband's motion to delete
alimony provision from divorce decree incorporating agreement.

8. Divorce <§=>247

That agreement incorporated into divorce decree was based in part on recognition of wife's assistance in husband's education could not be considered in determining divorced husband's right to termination
of $12,000 annual alimony award.
9. Divorce <§=>245(2)

Divorce decree containing awards for
support based on either expressed or assumed facts contemplated by parties or
court or both should not be modified, and
continuous jurisdiction of court to modify
should not be used to thwart expressed or
obvious intentions of parties and/or court
—unless such contemplated facts lead to
manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity.
10. Divorce <§=287

3. Divorce <§=>247

On divorced husband's motion to delete alimony provision from divorce decree,
divorced wife's equity in home and insurance policies awarded to her in divorce decree were impertinent.
4. Divorce <S=^247

On divorced husband's motion to delete alimony provision of divorce decree,
husband's sterilization 18 years before divorce was not pertinent matter.
5. Divorce <£=>247

On divorced husband's motion to delete alimony provision of divorce decree, it
was immaterial that he had since married a
woman with a child.

Where findings did not reflect such
inequity as justified drastic modification of
substituting award of $1 per year for
$12,000 per year alimony, but did represent
such change in circumstances as, with other changes, if shown, might justify some
lesser modification, reviewing court remanded case for new trial.

VanCott, Bagley, Cromwell & McCarthy,
Clifford L. Ashton, Thomas M. Burton,
Richard H. Stahle, Salt Lake City, for
plainti f f-appellant.
Gayle Dean Hunt, Salt Lake City, for
defendant-respondent.
H E N R I O D , Justice:

6. Divorce <§=>247

That divorced wife was qualified by
education and experience to support herself
was not appropriate consideration on divorced husband's motion to delete alimony
provision of divorce decree.
7. Divorce <§=>247

Neither finding that divorced wife,
who was under doctor's care and working
only part time when divorce decree was
entered, was presently working full time
nor other findings justified termination of
SI2,000 annual alimony award.

Appeal from a judgment reducing an
alimony award of $12,000 per year to
$1.00 per year. Reversed and remanded
for a new trial, with costs to appellant.
The parties had been wife and husband
for about 18 years before Mrs. F filed
for divorce. Incident thereto a 13-page
"Property Settlement Agreement" was executed by the parties, the significant part
of which, so far as this case is concerned,
was the following paragraph:
It is further agreed
. . . that
the aforesaid amount of alimony ($1,-
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000 per month)
. . .
is a reasonable sum in view of the efforts made
by plaintiff in assisting defendant in his
professional education and considering
the present circumstances and social
standing now enjoyed by Lee C. Felt:
and that said amount shall not be hereafter adjusted, notwithstanding increases
or decreases in any amount in the income of plaintiff, and notwithstanding
any changes in the income of the defendant unless said changes are substantial and so decrease the defendant's
income so that defendant is reasonably
unable to pay the alimony agreed to
herein.
The paragraph above certainly contemplates that plaintiff intended to seek employment for more than the part-time work
and its income, in which the record reflects she then was engaged, with no reference to or finding as to her then income.
The court, upon hearing the matter,
must have understood that Mrs. F accepted ihe $1,000 per month alimony on
condition that she could supplement it with
other income,-—otherwise the provision, to
which Mr. F, without objection, voluntarily became signatory, made no sense.
The court incorporated the paragraph as
a part of the decree, with the statement:
"which Property Settlement Agreement the
court hereby adopts as fair and reasonable." The findings and decree of the court
were supported by Mrs. F's testimony that
she was the main source of income for
the first seven years while her husband
was completing his medical training, that
she presently worked part-time and hoped
to work again, which the trial court remarked at that point, by asking what we
think was a very significant question to
the effect that: u So you can supplement
your income to some extent?" to which
Mrs. F said "Yes."
[1] About a year after the divorce, Mr.
F was cited for nonpayment of alimony
and was ordered to pay $4,000 in arrear-

ages, and again, about eight months later,
was ordered to pay another $8,000 for the
same reason, and pursuant thereto he was
ordered to appear about two months later
to determine the issue of contempt at
which time he was found in contempt, w~
sentenced to 10 days in jail, and given an
opportunity to purge himself by prompt!^
paying the alimony when it accrued, and
by paying off the past due judgments. At
the time Mr. F was cited for contemot,
he filed a motion to delete the alimony,
which was heard at the same time as the
contempt issue. Mr. F's counsel referred
to the case of Callister v. Calhster l which
holds in effect that the court has continuing jurisdiction to raise or lower alimony
irrespective of any agreement of the parties, if there is a change of circumstances
warranting such modification,—a principle
which consistently we have espoused,—
and a principle which simply is repeated
in the paragraph signed by the parties and
quoted above, the only question in the instant case being whether the burden of
proof, which in this case was Mr. F's,
was borne with such substantiality as to
warrant the emasculation of a $12,000
award of alimony except for a token annual $1.00 that certainly cannot be categorized as deficit financing.
Mr. F's brief makes much of certain
testimony, that the trial court apparently
did not believe, or which was not pertinent
in the hearing on the motion to amend
the decree, since nowhere are the facts reflected in said testimony found in the
court's written Findings, i. e.:
[2-5] Mr. F said he questioned the advisability of signing the agreement, but his
counsel advised him to sign it, saying any
district court judge would agree it wab
fair and equitable. His counsel proved to
be right, since the district court in a signed
decree said just that, and such evidence
is not pertinent since he signed the agreement. His counsel questioned Mrs. F as
to her role in helping Mr. F in securing
his medical education. This had already

I. 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953).
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been canvassed before the divorce decree
was entered, and hence was inapropos
here, but only a possible matter to consider on a motion for new trial or appeal.
He questioned Mrs. F about her present
income and the best he could get from
such interrogation was $9,000, without any
testimony or adduced facts about what
Mrs. F was making part-time at the time
of the decree. In such event the $9,000
is not an absolute and at best an elusive
factor in determining changed circumstances. He questioned her about her equity in the home and about insurance policies awarded to her in the decree,—facts
quite impertinent and inadmissible here.
He asked her about her husband's sterilization that occurred 18 years before the
divorce, another matter not pertinent and
a fact existing before and merged in the
decree. He asked Mr. F about his health
problem occurring after the decree, and
about the added burdens of his practice
and about his being so tired that he
stumbled around on going to bed, and
about consulting doctors and what they advised him, and about some immaterial
matters such as increased seminar costs,
insurance costs, etc. It is apparent that
the trial court thought the above recitals
either were immaterial or that he did not
believe Mr. F, since no mention of them
was made in the court's Findings. The
fact that Mr. F remarried a woman with
a child was not material, but considered
so in the Findings.
[6-8] What seems^to be cogent to us
in this case that the findings of the trial
court, some of which cannot be used in
a conclusion to relieve one of alimony payments, did not warrant the termination of
a $12,000 annual award. To justify our
conclusion in this respect we advert to the
Findings of the court, set forth in italics,
abstracted so far as pertinent here, as follows, without comments thereon in plain
type:
6. That plaintiff is qualified by education and experience to support herself,
which was demonstrated throughout the

marriage and particularly now after she
works full time, 7i'hile only part time
at the time of the decree, at which time
she zuas under the doctor's care.
This finding has to do largely with matters existing before the decree and taken
into account in arriving at the alimony
award, except that part about full-time
employment, and with that exception the
Finding is on matters that are res judicata and if canvassable at all, were matters to be considered on timely appeal, not
three or four years later on motion to
amend.
7. That the agreement was based in
part on recognition of Mrs. F's assistance in Mr. F's education; that such efforts were substantial, but that his education was substantially completed before the marriage.
All the facts recited in this finding were
before the court prior to the decree and
cannot be considered by another division
of the court three years later, since they
are merged in the decree, are res judicata,
and their consideration in this* case is
tantamount to the granting of a threeyear belated new trial on the merits,—and
hence cannot be considered in determining
the modification of the alimony award.
8. That Mrs. F was entitled to alimony for a given period of time sufficient to adjust to single life; that to
continue to allow permanent alimony in
the light of present circumstances is unjust, unnecessary and unequitable and
hence the decree should be modified to
nothing but $1.00 a year.
This Finding mostly is a conclusion and
not a statement of proven fact and there
is nothing recited therein to indicate what
present circumstances are, let alone that
they are unjust,—all of which amounts to
an ipse dixit probative of nothing enlightening in determining that an alimony
award should be modified. Besides, it is
somewhat of an affront to the decree whose
author entertained the motion and said that
it was fair and reasonable that any increase or decrease in Mrs. F's income, as
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agreed to by Mr. F, should not be considered as a factor in any adjustment of
the award.
9. That Mrs. F's earnings are sufficient to maintain herself without dependence on Mr. F.
This simply is a conclusion not bottomed
on any specific facts recounted anywhere
in the Findings, and it is impotent as a
factor in changing the award.
10. That Mr. F has remarried one
who has a child, both of whom he supports; that Mrs. F is single.
The fact of remarriage cannot be used in
determining modification of an alimony
award, although in some conceivable rare
case it might, and we are at a loss to
know why the trial court so found,—unless it was on account of what was said
in Callister v. Callister, supra, which recited the fact of remarriage, which we disaffirm if it is urged that such fact is admissible for the purpose of reducing the
alimony award in the instant case.
11. That since the divorce Mr. F's
costs of doing business has substantially increased, as has his income but not
commensurate
therewith.
Nothing is reflected in this Finding that
would indicate that Mr. F's income had
decreased so that he was reasonably unable to pay what he agreed or to justify
the wiping out of a $12,000-per-year-alimony award, and we are unimpressed with
such a generalized, unspecific finding in
this case.
12. That Mrs. F's income is substantially higher than at the time of divorce.
The Finding does not state how much
higher, and represents conjecture, since
there is no fact stated in comparison as
2. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952
(1916) ; Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87,
475 P.2d 1021 (1970) ; Short v. Short,
25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971).
See also 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 21 (1951) where
it is observed that "Where the alleged
change in circumstances of the parties is
one that the trial court expected and

to what Mrs. F's income was at the time
of divorce, because there was no evidence
before the decree or thereafter as to her
part-time income.
14. That substantial changes in the
circumstances
have occurred since the
decree.
This kind oi Finding is fraught with
meaninglessness without - y recitation as
to v hat the substantial changes were, and
lends nothing to a ; ^stification for the
elimination of an annual $12,000 alimony
award.
[9,10] We think th- written Findings
in this case are so fr xgmentary and unspecific as not to justify the drastic elimination of an annual $12,000 award, except for a dollar, and we so hold. In doing so, we affirm our previous pronouncements that a divorce decree containing
awards for support based on either expressed or assumed facts contemplated by
the parties or the court or both, should
not be modified when the contemplated
facts are obvious or agreed to by the parties and in turn incorporated in the decree, in which event the continuous jurisdiction of the court to modify should not
be used to thwart the expressed or obvious intentions of the parties and/or the
court,—unless such contemplated facts lead
to manifest injustice or unconscionable inequity. 2 The Findings of the instant case,
in our opinion, do not reflect such inequity justifying the drastic modification indulged, but do represent some change in
circumstances that, with 3ther changes, if
shown, might in the aggregate °quire the
application of the rule that the court in a
proper case is not bound by an agreement,
that might warrant some lesser or total modification. Therefore we are constrained to remand this case for a new
probably made allowances for when entering the original decree, the CL<*»nge is
not a ground for modification of the decree." See also concurring opinion of
two of the Justices in MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066
(1951).
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trial with instructions to entertain evidence
of facts occurring after, not before, the
decree was entered, and in accordance
with the observations stated herein,—and
we so hold. (Emphasis added.)
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT,
E L L E T T and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

tion of employee and removed any foundation upon which to impute negligence to
employer, whose liability was derivative
and secondary,; and plaintiff was not entitled to maintain action against employer.
Remanded to grant defendant's motion
for summary judgment.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion
in which Tuckett, J., concurred.

: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>

1. Master and Servant <§=>300

27 Utah 2d 109
Hal E. HOLMSTEAD, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., Defendant
and Appellant.

No. 12257.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 25, 1972.

Action against corporation alleging
that its employee, while operating motor
vehicle within scope of his employment,
negligently collided with plaintiff's vehicle,
causing plaintiff injuries and property loss,
wherein defendant moved for summary
judgment on ground that plaintiff's covenant not to sue employee operated as matter of law to release defendant from liability and, prior to hearing on motion, plaintiff filed action against employee and his
carrier for reformation of covenant not to
sue. The Fourth District Court, Utah
County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., granted decree of reformation, denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment and granted
defendant's petition for intermediate appeal. The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J.,
held that where covenant not to sue specified that injured plaintiff understood that
agreement was to terminate further controversy respecting all claims for damages
which plaintiff had asserted or that he or
his personal representatives might thereafter assert against negligent employee, the
covenant constituted a complete exonera493 P.2d—40

A master's liability for acts of his
servant is under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
2. Master and Servant <§^333

Under doctrine of respondeat superior,
liability of master to third person for injuries inflicted by servant in course of his
employment and within scope of his authority is derivative and secondary, while
that of servant is primary, and, in absence
of any delict of master other than through
the servant, exoneration of servant removes foundation upon which to impute
negligence to the master.
3. Contribution <§=>5

While master may be jointly sued with
servant for a servant's tort committed
within scope of his authority or employment, they are not joint tort-feasors in
sense that they are equal wrongdoers without right of contribution.
4. Indemnity <3=>I3(I)
Subrogation <§=?! I

If master is required to respond to
third person in damages by reason of his
liability under doctrine of respondeat superior, he will be subrogated to rights of injured third party and may recover over
from his servant who is primarily liable.
5. Release <3=>37

Where covenant not to sue specified
that injured plaintiff understood that
agreement was to terminate further controversy respecting all claims for damages
which plaintiff had asserted, or that he or
his personal representatives might thereafter assert, against negligent employee, the

ALLEN v., ALLEN
Utah
1021
Cite as 475 P.2d 1021
to Rule 33, tioning for modification of alimony and
support provisions of divorce decree.

to interrogatories pursuant
U.R.GP.
However, under the pleadings and affidavits filed in this case, I am convinced
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover,
and so I concur in reversing the uial court.

O
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23 Utah 2d 87
Ruth Cafn A L L E N , Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Arthur A. ALLEN, Jr., Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 11918.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 17, 1970.

Proceeding by ex-husband to modify
alimony provisions of divorce decree. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Emmett L. Brown, J., denied petition, and
ex-husband appealed. The Supreme Court,
Ruggeri, District Judge, held that where
decree of divorce contemplated that wife
would secure employment and contribute
to her own support, and that former residence of parties would be sold and proceeds
divided, and no provision was made in decree of divorce for two adult daughters of
parties who were residing with wife and
attending college at time of divorce, facts
that wife subsequently found employment,
that former residence was sold and proceeds
divided, and that one of daughters had
married and left home and other had secured gainful employment did not constitute a substantial change of material circumstances warranting modification of alimony provisions of divorce decree.
Affirmed.
Callister and Henriod, JJ., did not participate.

I. Divorce <S=>245(3)

Burden of showing a substantial
change of circumstances is upon party peti-

2. Divorce €=»245(2)

Where decree of divorce contemplated
that wife would secure employment and
contribute to her own support, and that
former residence of parties would be sold
and proceeds divided, and no provision was
-nade in decree of divorce for two adult
jaughters of parties who were residing with
wife and attending college at time of divorce, facts that wife subsequently found
employment, that former residence was sold
and proceeds divided, and that one of
daughters had married and left home and
other had secured gainful employment did
not constitute a substantial change of material circumstances warranting modification of alimony provisions of divorce decree.

Harold G. Christensen, of Worsley, Snow
& Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
James W. Beless, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
RUGGERI, District Judge:
Appeal from a judgment denying defendant's petition to modify a divorce decree.
On October 10, 1968, the plaintiff was
granted a decree of divorce from the defendant, and was awarded the custody of a
minor child; $100 per month for the child's
support; and alimony of $200 per month.
The plaintiff, at the date of the granting
of the divorce, was not employed, but contemplated securing employment within six
months to assist her in adequately maintaining a home for herself and minor child.
As of the date of the divorce decree, two
additional daughters of the parties, not
minors, were college students and residing
with the plaintiff. While the divorce hearing was conducted as a default matter, the
defendant was nevertheless present, and, in
effect, stipulated to the terms of settlement
as decreed by the court. Shortly following
the divorce hearing the plaintiff found em-
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ployment, and at the time the petition for
modification of the decree was heard her
net monthly earnings were approximately
$210.
The defendant's petition for modification
is predicated upon a substantial change in
the material circumstances of either one or
bof i oi the parties since the entry of the
decree of divorce, "ie bases his contention
on several facts, one of which is that the
plaintiff has permanent employment, and
he seeks a discontinuance of the alimony
allowance of .200 per month. However,
the decree of d'vorce, when granted, contemplated that the plaintiff would secure
employment an ^ contribute to her own support. The dt**-ndant further contends that
since the former residence of the parties
was sold, and the proceeds divided, this
fact constitutes a material change in the
plaintiff's financial circumstances. However, here again, there is a development
that was contemplated at the time of the
trial court's decree. Clearly, no provision
was made in the decree of divorce for the
two adult daughters of the parties who were
residing with their mother and attending
college at the time of the divorce, and the
fact that one has married and left plaint i f f s home, and that the other has secured
gainful employment, has no relevance to the
alleged change of plaintiff's circumstances
as related to the provisions of the divorce
decree for alimony and support money. Admittedly, there has been no material change
in the income or circumstances of the defendant since the granting of the divorce
decree.

[1,2] Subjecting the defendant's application for modification to thorough scrutiny, as did the trial court, and bearing in
mind that the burden of showing a substantial change of circumstances is upon the defendant, 1 the facts in the instant case fail
to support the intervention of this court,
and the'trial court's judgment is affirmed
with costs to the plaintiff.

CROCKETT, C. J., E L L E T T and
T U C K E T T , JJ., and J O S E P H E. NELSON, District Judge, concur.
CALLISTER and H E N R I O D , JJ., having disqualified themselves, do not participate herein.

O

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM,

23 Utah 2d 89
STATE of Utah, By and Through its ROAD
COMMISSION, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Stewart B. MACKEY, a single man, Paul H.
Sherritt and Joy D. Sherritt, his wife,
Ernest E. Gurr and Gwendolyn Gurr, his
wife, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 11916.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 27, 1970.

Appeal by landowners from a judgment
of the Fourth District Court, Summit County, Maurice Harding, J., in condemnation
proceeding. The Supreme Court, Ellett,
J., held that evidence supported $4,990
award to landowners.
Affirmed.

Eminent Domain <£=I49

Evidence, m condemnation proceeding,
supported $4,990 award to landowners.

Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Carl J.
Nemelka, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for defendants-appellants.

I. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180.
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Phil Hansen and Associates, Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant.
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiif and respondent.
T U C K E T T , Justice:
The plaintiff filed her action at law in
the court below seeking to recover damages for a claimed battery committed upon
her by th defendant. At a subsequent time
the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in
whica she added various other claims
sounding in both tort and contract. After
the fii-ng of ihese proceedings the plaintiff pr >cured the issuance of an order restrain? ug the defendant from committing
other acts of violence or in any way molesting her. The propriety of issuing the order
in the first instance would seem doubtful
inasmuch as the plaintiff's action for damages would appear to be an adequate remedy, and if not she had available a statutory
proceedings pursuant to the provisions of
Title 77y Chap. 4. However that matter is
not before us inasmuch as the defendant
consented that an order be issued by the
court restraining him from molesting or interfering with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff filed her affidavit alleging
that the defendant had violated the court's
injunction and an order to show cause was
issued by the court ordering the defendant
to appear on a day certain to answer for the
alleged violation. At the conclusion of the
hearing the court orally found the defendant in contempt of court and sentenced him
to serve 15 days in the county jail with 10
days suspended on condition that the defendant pay to the plaintiff $100.00 attorney's fee. The court did not make and
enter written findings of fact and judgment. The defendant has appealed to this
court claiming that the pronounced sentence
of the court was erroneous under the prior
decisions of this court requiring the entry of
written findings of fact and a judgment. 1
The plaintiff here contends that the court
not having made findings of fact and not
having entered a judgment thereon there is

no final judgment from which an appeal
might be taken pursuant to Rule 72(a),
U.R.C.P.
It appears that the appeal taken by the
defendant was not from a final judgment
as required by the rule above mentioned,
and the appeal therefore must be dismissed
and it is so ordered. No costs awarded.
CALLISTER, C. J., and E L L E T T ,
H E N R I O D and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.

s>

KEY MUNICH STSTW

25 Utah 2d 326
Wanda Martha SHORT, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Ralph Arlind SHORT, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 12225.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 19, 1971.

Proceeding by divorced husband seeking modification of alimony award. The
District Court, Salt Lake County, Emmett
L. Brown, J., dismissed petition, and husband appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that refusal to vacate alimony
award of $75 per month to divorced wife,
who was unemployed at time of award, who
had been employed prior thereto, and who
obtained employment thereafter, without
consideration of parties' present circumstances in relation to circumstances at time
of decree was not abuse of discretion.
Affirmed and remanded.
Ellett, J., concurred in result.

Divorce C=>246
Refusal to vacate alimony award of
$75 per month to divorced wife, who was
unemployed at time of award, who had

I. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519.
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een employed prior thereto, and who obained employment thereafter, without conideration of parties' present circumstances
n relation to circumstances at time of der e e was not abuse of discretion.

Joseph P. McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for
defendant-appellant.
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr., of Kirton &
McConkie, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffrespondent.
H E N R I O D , Justice:
Appeal from a judgment of dismissal of
a petition for modification of an alimony
award downward. Affirmed with costs
on appeal to Mrs. Short, with a remand
that the question of attorney's fees, if any,
be resolved by the trial court where certain aspects of this case still are pending.
The parties were married in 1947 and
have two children. A divorce complaint
was filed in 1961 and found repose, for
some undisclosed reason, in the court's
archives till 1966 when it became restless
and was amended, resulting in a divorce in
January 1967, in which Mrs. Short, unemployed at the time, was awarded $75 per
month alimony and a like amount for support of the children. Mrs. S., who had
been employed in the past, obtained employment thereafter, after which Mr. S.
filed a petition to eliminate the alimony,
on the ground of changed circumstances,
and was denied relief. It appears obvious
to us that the award in the decree was consistent with and based upon the assumption that Mrs. S. again would be able to
obtain employment,—otherwise the trial
court's socioeconomic philosophy would
have been superficially inane. Less than
a year later Mr. S. petitioned again to
eliminate the alimony and again was re-

buffed, as he was again in July 1970, by
dismissal thereof, subject of this appeal.
There is but one point on appeal: That
the court erred in failing to compare the
parties' present circumstances in relation to
those at the time of the decree.
By and large in the ordinary divorce case
the appellant's contention would be meritorious and the cases decided by this court
sustain his contention. The difficulty here
is that in exercising the latitude of discretion accorded to and recognized in the trial
court in these domestic relations matters
the appellant's contention is not immalleafre, but must yield to reason and the
equities attendant in each particular case.
In the instant case, we must and do assume that the court did not intend that the
$75 alimony award would be eliminated if
Mrs. S. obtained a job paying $75 per
month,—or even $175 per month,—or even
$389 per month, the income of Mrs. S. at
her job at time of the third petition to
eliminate the alimony. We think the facts
in this case themselves reflect no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court in
refusing to vacate the $75 alimony award,
and we base our conclusion here, not necessarily on any authority to the effect that
the court views the facts in relation to the
last petition for modification, 1 but because
the denial was not capricious when viewed
in the light of circumstances existing at
the time of the decree,—the $75 award
implemented by a necessary and inescapable
assumption by the court that Mrs. S. could
not survive under any conceivable hypothesis on $75 per month, and there is nothing in the record to indicate she had any
other means of livelihood.
CALLISTER, C. J., and T U C K E T T and
CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
ELLETT,

1. 18 A.L.R.2d IS.

].y concurs in the

result
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Sharon Mae DAVIS, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Charles Francis DAVIS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18077.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 22, 1982.

ment of house, and husband had no right to
possession.
2. Divorce &=> 252.3(3)
Divorce award of one third of out-ofstate property, acquired by husband prior to
marriage but paid for, in part, from joint
account during marriage, to wife and twothirds to husband was within ambit of trial
court's discretion, notwithstanding that
three fourths of purchase price was paid
prior to marriage.

Husband appealed from a decree of
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for
divorce entered by the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., chal- defendant and appellant.
lenging the property division. The SuPaul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plainpreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) finan- tiff and respondent.
cial arrangement on marital home, awarding husband one half of equity in property
HOWE, Justice:
at time of trial plus one half of any increase
This is an appeal by the defendant
accruing in future due to inflation but failCharles Francis Davis from a decree of
ing to provide husband any interest in indivorce entered in an action brought
creased equity in house which would result
against him by his wife, Sharon Mae Davis,
by virtue of his paying aftmony designed to
plaintiff. He challenges the division of
cover amount of second mortgage payment,
property made by the trial court.
was inequitable, and (2) award of one third
The parties were married on March 5,
of out-of-state property, acquired by husband prior to marriage but paid for, in part, 1974. Both had been previously married.
from joint account during marriage, to wife "Plaintiff gave up a $150 per month alimony
and two-thirds to husband was within am- award from her previous divorce when she
married the defendant. The plaintiff had
bit of trial court's discretion.
three children by her first marriage and
Remanded.
she, the children and the defendant lived
together in a house which she owned at the
time of her marriage to the defendant.
1. Divorce ®=* 252.5(1)
The
plaintiff was employed during the last
Divorce decree's financial arrangement
two
years
of the marriage and at the time
on marital home, which awarded husband
of
trial
was
earning $687 net per month.
one half of equity in property at time of
She
also
received
child support from her
trial plus one half of any increase accruing
in future due to inflation but failed to former husband.
provide him any interest in increased equity
No children were born to the parties.
in house which would result by virtue of his During the six years they lived together
paying alimony designed to cover amount they expended substantial amounts of monof second mortgage payment, was inequita- ey to improve the house. The defendant
ble where, when amount of life insurance paid the plaintiff's former husband $1,300
premiums and interest on second mortgage to satisfy a lien he held on the property.
balance were added to mortgage balance, Although the plaintiff disputed it, he
husband would be required to make postde- claimed that he further invested in it moncree payments totalling amount nearly dou- ey which he had received as an inheritance
ble equity awarded him, all proceeds of from his mother's estate, as well as money
second mortgage loan went into improve- he received from a personal injury settle-
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ment. There is no dispute that shortly before the separation of the parties they
obtained a second mortgage loan to remodel
part of the house and to make an addition
of 450 square feet. The balance on that
mortgage at the time of trial was $15,876.27. The monthly payments were $345.
Prior to their marriage, the defendant in
1967 purchased under contract four one-half
acre lots in New Mexico for $6,200. Threefourths of that price was paid prior to the
marriage in 1974 and the balance of the
contract was paid from their joint account
during the marriage.
The trial court apparently concluded
from the evidence that the equity of the
parties in the house had increased $23,000
during the marriage. It awarded the defendant one-half of that equity ($11,500)
plus one-half of any increase which may
accrue in the future due to inflation and
made that award payable when the plaintiff remarried, sold the property or her
youngest child attained the age of 18 years.
The court further ordered the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff $420 per month alimony
until such time as the second mortgage had
been paid in full, and ordered that he maintain sufficient insurance on his life to insure payment of the mortgage balance in
the event of his death. An order was made
that the parties sell the New Mexico lots
and divide the proceeds between them as
follows: One-third to plaintiff and twothirds to defendant.
The defendant's main contention is that
it was inequitable for the trial court to deny
him any interest in the increased equity in
the house which will result by virtue of his
paying alimony designed to cover the
amount of the second mortgage payment.
Defendant refers us to the Conclusions of
Law in which the trial judge took the
monthly payment on the second mortgage
of $345 and added to it $75 for the general
support of the plaintiff, and then ordered
the defendant to pay a total of $420 each
month to her, terming it alimony.
[1] We agree that this financial arrangement on the house was inequitable.
The trial court properly awarded the de-

fendant one-half of the equity in the property at the time of trial plus one-half of any
increase accruing in the future due to inflation. It wisely provided that such "equity
should not be payable to the defendant until plaintiff should remarry, sell the property, or until her youngest child attained the
age of 18 years. Thi" provision assured the
plaintiff and her children a place t^ live.
But after having done that, the tria court
upset the equity of that division by requiring the defendant to make a further substantial investment in the property without
any corresponding benefit to hiiu. When
the amount of the life insurance j -emiums
and the interest on the second mortgage
balance are added to the mortgage balance,
the defendant will be required ic make post
decree payments totalling an amount nearly
double the equity awarded to him. This
was unfair to him and weighted the division
of the property heavily in the plaintiffs
favor. Fairness dictates that he should realize something out of the increased equity
which will result from his providing the
funds to retire the second mortgage. The
unfairness is evident when it is considered
that all the proceeds of the second mortgage loan went into the improvement of the
house. Also, he has no right to possession.
It should also be noted that he was ordered
to pay approximately $9,000 of debts and
$1,000 attorney's fees for his wife. The
decree should be amended to allow the defendant's participation to the extent of onehalf in the increased equity brought about
by the reduction of or retirement of the
second mortgage.
[2] We find no error in the division of
the New Mexico property. Althougn it was
contracted for and partially paid lor prior
to the marriage, a substantial number of
the monthly payments were made after the
marriage. We find it to be within the
ambit of discretion of the trial court to
award the plaintiff one-third of that property and two-thirds to the defendant.
Remanded to the trial court to amend the
decree in conformance with this opinion.
Each party to bear his or her own costs.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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to be compensated, under the evidence
for pain and suffering and a loss of 22%
days wages, irrespective of prospective
damages, which the jury and trial court
evidently doubted. Obviously, the jury
failed to consider these items of damage.
The verdict was defective in form in that
it did not comprehend all the items of
damages contained in the instructions
given by the court, it was therefore insufficient.
*
*
*
*
*
*
If counsel be permitted to remain mute
when a verdict is insufficient or informal,
he gains an unfair strategic advantage
[and since] there must be reasonable rules
to control the termination of litigation, if
counsel has an opportunity to correct error at the time of its occurrence and he
fails to do so, any objection based thereupon is waived.18
[8] In the present case the plaintiff
alleges the verdict is insufficient as to damages suffered as a result of the delivery of
the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff was under a responsibility to object to this patent
insufficiency at the time the verdict was
rendered. Since the plaintiff did not avail
himself of the opportunity to object to the
verdict before the jury was dismissed, any
later objection to its insufficiency is
waived.19
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL
and STEWART, JJ., concur.
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Sheila Penrose Larsen LAND, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
William Dennis LAND, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 16238.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 22, 1980.

On cross motions to modify a divorce
decree, the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Christine M. Durham, J., entered
an order for appraisal of certain real property and for conveyance by the husband to
the wife. The husband appealed, and the
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that the trial
court acted within its discretion in applying
the commonly accepted definition of the
term "equity" in interpreting a written
stipulation of the parties which was incorporated into the divorce decree.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., concurred in the result.

1. Divorce <s=> 252.2
In dividing property between divorcing
spouses, trial court is governed by general
principles of equity. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
2. Divorce <s=*164
Court which issues divorce decree re=
tains continuing jurisdiction over the parties and may modify the decree due to a
change in circumstances, equitable considerations governing.

Id, 491 P2d at 1214

19. The plaintiff could realize definite advantage
in the present case because of the complexity
of the factual issues involved, the duration of
the trial and the vast volume of evidence
presented The instructions given to the jury
by the court apprised them of the applicable
law governing the recovery of damages in this
action In those instructions the jury was told
that in determining the liability of the defendant Sather the jury was to consider the possi-

v

bihty of mitigation of damages by Ute-Cal's
tender of the monies expended by Sather as
guarantor of the loan They were also instructed on the restrictions to awarding speculative
damages and the plaintiff admitted the exact
amount received as rents could not be calculated The plaintiff had ample opportunity to
present evidence concerning the damages suffered during the trial and no injustice is rendered by denying the plaintiff an opportunity to
"try again" with a new jury
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3. Divorce <s=> 249.2
When a divorce decree is based on a
property settlement agreement devised by
the parties and sanctioned by the court,
equity must take the agreement into consideration.
4. Equity <s=»23
Equity is not available to reinstate
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted
away simply because one has come to regret
the bargain made.
5. Divorce <*=> 249.2, 254(2)
The trial court has discretion to adopt
or reject an agreement between divorcing
parties as part of the original decree or a
modification thereof, as equity may dictate.

written stipulation, incorporated into divorce decree, wherein parties agreed that
wife would receive as sole property a 50
percent interest in the "present equity" of
certain real property and that the husband
would receive as sole property a 50 percent
interest in that "equity."
Paul N. Cotro Manes, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Neils E. Mortenson, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.

HALL, Justice:
Defendant appeals, challenging the district court's interpretation of the term "equity" as it appears in the stipulation and
6. Husband and Wife *=> 279(2)
property settlement agreement of the parThe law limits the continuing jurisdic- ties.
tion of a divorce court where a property
Plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce
settlement has been incorporated into the
from defendant on November 19, 1974.
decree and the outright abrogation of such
Said decree specifically adopted the provian agreement may be resorted to only for
sions of the written stipulation in question,
compelling reasons.
and, where pertinent to this appeal, the
stipulation provided:
7. Husband and Wife <s=> 279(1)
Where parties to written stipulation
7. The parties agree that the business
that was specifically adopted in divorce deknown as the Eat'n House located at Salt
cree used the term "equity" without equivoLake City, Utah, shall be awarded entirecation or elaboration and, seemingly, in its
ly to Defendant with Defendant having
usual and ordinary context, it was approprifull ownership of all assets and full reate for the court to interpret the term in
sponsibility for all debts arising thereaccordance with common usage.
from.
8. The Defendant agrees to assume as
8. Contracts <s=> 147(2)
his sole obligation all debts and obligaWhere possible, the underlying intent
tions incurred by the parties up to the
of a contract is to be gleaned from the
29th day of October 1974 except those
language of the instrument itself.
specifically mentioned herein and agrees
9. Contracts «=>169
to defend and hold the Plaintiff harmless
It is only when contractual language is
therefrom.
uncertain or ambiguous that extrinsic evi9. The parties agree that the Plaintiff
dence need be resorted to.
shall receive as her sole property a 50
percent interest in the present equity of
10. Contracts <*=> 143(2)
the home and real property located at
Mere fact that parties urge diverse def5171 South 2870 East, Salt Lake City,
initions of contract terminology is not suffiUtah and the Defendant shall receive as
cient to render the terminology ambiguous.
his sole property a 50 percent interest in
11. Husband and Wife <•=» 279(1)
that equity. The value of the equity
shall be determined not later than JanuTrial court acted well within its discreary 1, 1975 by at least two independent
tion in applying the commonly accepted
appraisers selected by the parties for that
definition of the term "equity" to interpret
605 P2d—27
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purpose. Should the appraisals fail to
agree, the two appraisers shall select a
third appraiser^ and an average value
shall be determined. The percentage interests shall be paid to the parties at the
time of receipt of funds on any sale of
the property, or shall be paid by the
Plaintiff within two years following the
date of majority or emancipation of the
youngest surviving child of the parties.
The 50 percent interest awarded to the
Defendant shall bear interest at 3 percent
per annum from January 1, 1975 until
paid. Any increase in equity in the home
and real property after the fixing of the
interests described herein shall accrue to
the benefit of the Plaintiff and Defendant shall have no rights over any such
increase.
*
*
*
*
*
*
11. The Plaintiff specifically agrees to
assume as her sole obligation the first
mortgage on the home and to make the
required payments on that mortgage.
The Defendant specifically agrees to assume as. his sole obligation the second
mortgage on the home and to make the
required payments until this mortgage is
paid in full.
The debts and obligations recited in the
stipulation (in addition to the two mortgages), were mostly associated with defendant's business establishment, the Eat'n
House. Certain of said debts (totalling
some $27,000), had been reduced to judgment and hence constituted liens on the real
property at that time.
This matter came before the district
court on cross-motions to modify the decree
of divorce for various reasons not pertinent
here. In addition, plaintiffs motion sought
to compel defendant to quit-claim to her all
of his interest in the subject real property.
Plaintiff asserted that defendant had no
1. Despite the provisions of paragraph 9 of the
stipulation, no appraisal of the property was
undertaken. However, the undisputed affidavit
of plaintiff estimated the value of the property
at the time of the divorce to be $52,000. Inasmuch as the liens on the property totalled $27,000 and the two mortgages totalled $25,000,
the remaining equity would be nominal at best,

actual interest in the property by reason of
the fact that no equity existed therein.
This was so, explained plaintiff, because the
total of the mortgages and the ether liens
exceeded the value of thr property at the
time of the stipulation and decree of divorce.1
The court below ordered that appraisal be
made as of January 1, 1975, and tha< defendant convey to plairtiff (upon payment
to him of the value, if any, of the interest
granted him by the stipulation), al interest
in the property. This interest wa^ to be
measured by calculating the "equity in the
property as the market value as of January
1. 1975, less any liens, mortgage obligations or other encumbrances as Ox that date.
It is only from that order that defendant
appeals.
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is
that the court below failed "to do equity" in
interpreting the stipulation. However, he
concedes that the record is silent "as to just
what was meant by the parties for the
calculation of the equity in the real property." He simply asserts that the trial court
should have calculated the equity as the
appraised value, less the amount of the first
and second mortgages only.
[1-6] Defendant's contention that the
court must look behind his stipulation in
order to do equity is without merit. True it
is that, in making a division of property by
a decree of divorce a trial court is governed
by general principles of equity.2 It is likewise true that the court retains conf'nuing
jurisdiction over the parties and mf modify the decree due to a change in circumstances, equitable considerations igain to
govern.3 It must, however, be added that,
when a decree is based upon a property
settlement agreement, forged by the parties
and sanctioned by the court, equity must
assuming the accuracy of the trial court's interpretation (discussed infra).
2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5.
3. Id. See also, Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47
P.2d 894 (1935).
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take such agreement into consideration.4
Equity is not available to reinstate rights
and privileges voluntarily contracted away
simply because one has come to regret the
bargain made.5 Accordingly, the law limits
the continuing jurisdiction of the court
where a property settlement agreement has
been incorporated into the decree,6 and the
outright abrogation of the provisions of
such an agreement is only to be resorted to
with great reluctance and for compelling
reasons.'
[7] The parties chose to use the term
"equity" without equivocation or elaboration, and, seemingly, in its usual and ordinary context. Consequently, we deem it
appropriate for the trial court to have
placed a common usage meaning upon the
term and that is precisely what it did. By
interpreting the term "equity" as it did, the
court made an effort, not to supplant the
original agreement, but simply to construe
it in the manner as contemplated by the
parties at the time it was drafted.

other liens.10 The courts have generally
followed the foregoing definitions of the
term.11
[8-10] Where possible, the underlying
intent of a contract is to be gleaned from
the language of the instrument itself; only
where the language is uncertain or ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to.12
No such ambiguity is present in this case,
nor was it asserted. Also, the mere fact
that the parties urge diverse definitions of
contract terminology does not, per se, render it ambiguous.13
[11] The trial court acted well within its
discretion in applying the commonly accepted definition of the term "equity" as used
in the context of the stipulation14 and its
judgment is therefore affirmed. No costs
awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
STEWART, JJ., concur.

The term "equity" is described as the
money value of a property or of an interest
in property in excess of claims or liens
against it.8 It is the amount of value of a
property above the total liens or charges.9
It is the value in excess of mortgage or
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4. 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, Sec. 1082; Nieminen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 573 P.2d 1227 (1978).

8. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, 1961.

5.

Defendant concedes that he would normally
be bound by his stipulation but cites the case of
Klein v. Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472 (1975) as
supportive of his position. Such reliance is
misplaced. That decision dealt with a situation
wherein an original decree of divorce, not itself
the product of any agreement, was modified by
the trial court according to the terms of an
alleged stipulation which the appellant denied
making. The trial court has discretion to adopt
or reject an agreement between the parties as
part of the original decree (or a modification
thereof), as equity might dictate. See Nelson
on Divorce, (2d ed., 1945), § 13.45.

9.

6.

Callister v. CaUister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d
944 (1953); see also Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations, Sec. 16.13.

13. Camp v. Deseret Mutual
Utah, 589 P.2d 780 (1979).

7.

See LeBreton v. LeBreton, Utah, 604 P.2d 469
(1979).

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979.

10. Funk & Wagnall's Standard Comprehensive
International Dictionary, 1976.
11. See e. g., Comstock v. Fiorella, 260 Cal.
App.2d 262, 67 Cal.Rptr. 104 (1968); Pierson v.
Bill, 138 Ha. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Des
Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Allen, 220
Iowa 448, 261 N.W. 912 (1935).
12. Oberhansly v. Ear/e, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384
(1977); Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 18
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966).
Benefit

Ass'n,

14. Pugh v. Stockdale, Utah, 570 P.2d 1027
(1977); Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, Utah,
565 P.2d 776 (1977).
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Dixie Roblek LeBRETON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.

Thomas Edward LeBRETON,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 15923e
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 20, 1979.
Ex-husband appealed from an order of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David K. Winder, J., which equally divided
the equity in certain real property between
the parties as of the date of their divorce.
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that in
view of 1969 divorce decree's ambiguity as
to whether the equity of marital home
should, in 1977, after wife had remarried
and children had both reached the age of
majority, be divided according to its present
value or its value at the time of the divorce,
a remand of the case would be ordered for
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of
determining what is reasonable and necessary to do now, pursuant to statute providing in relevant part that "The court shall
have continuing jurisdiction to make such
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to * * * the distribution of the
property as shall be reasonable and necessary."
Reversed and remanded.
Hall, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Divorce <s=>287
In view of 1969 divorce decree's ambiguity as to whether the equity of marital
home should, in 1977, after wife had remarried and children had both reached the age
of majority, be divided according to its
present value or its value at the time of the
divorce, a remand of the case would be
ordered for an evidentiary hearing for the
purpose of determining what is reasonable
and necessary to do now, pursuant to statute providing in relevant part that "The
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to

make such subsequent changes or new orders with respect to * * * the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and necessary." U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.

Don Blackham, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
Thorm P. Vuyk, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and respondent.
WILKINS, Justice:
Deiendant appeals from an order of the
District Court which equally divided the
equit;, in certain real property between
plafritiff and defendant as of the date of
their divorce.
On April 28, 1969, plaintiff sued for divorce. The parties entered into a stipulation providing for the division of the subject property and the same was accepted
and approved by the Court. The pertinent
portion thereof reads as follows:
With regard to the house, it will be sold
upon her remarriage or when the home is
no longer needed for the minor children,
at which time the home will be sold and
the equity as of the date of the divorce
will be divided equally among the parties
with the further stipulation that the
Plaintiff shall have all of the principal
payment made by her after the date of
the divorce before the costs of sale and
then the remaining equity will be divided
equally. [Emphasis added.]
In June of 1977, defendant filed an affidavit ir support of an order to show cause
why Tie house should not be sold and the
proceeds therefrom distributed according to
the provisions of the decree. Plaintiff had
remarried in the interim and the children
had both reached the age of majority. A
hearing was held on April 14, 1978. The
District Court ordered that the equity of
the home be divided "by sale or buy-out"
according to its value at the time of the
divorce nine years earlier. It is specifically
from this order that defendant appeals.
The single claim on appeal by defendant
is that the District Court misconstrued the

Q.
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terms of the decree of divorce, and that
properly read, the above-quoted language
mandates a division of the equity as of the
time oi the sale (after subtracting principal
payments made by plaintiff after the original divorce decree). The plaintiff argues
contrarily, contending that the time of divorce controls the date that this division
shall occur. The difference such an interpretatior .vould make in the portion of the
proceeds going to defendant would be substantial, as the equity in the home has been
enhanced markedly by the dramatic increase in property values in the area during
the past decade.
The District Judge verbally stated at this
hearing:
Well, I have heard the statements of
both of you that you would both testify,
if you were to take the stand . . .
to a different interpretation of this paragraph. . .
So, I think it would be
a standoff as far as the testimony is
concerned
but I think that
with that wording in there, "the equity as
of the date of this divorce," I think that
has got to tip the balance and I think
that is what we are talking about. That
is what I hold . . .
it was the equity as of the date of the divorce.
The District Court also stated in its Findings and Conclusions in this hearing:
The Court finds that though ambiguous
the meaning of the decree is that the
equity as of the date of the divorce would
be the value to be divided among the
parties.
Additionally, the attorney for plaintiff, who
prepared the Findings, Conclusions, and Decree in the original divorce action, noted
initially in this opinion, conceded in the
hearing in 1978 that there was an ambiguity, and the attorney for defendant also—in
essence—in this 1978 hearing acknowledged
a basis for two interpretations.
We agree that there is ambiguity, and
conclude that we should remand for an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of determining what is reasonable and necessary to
do now, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,
1. Pursuant to the continuing junsdicti

Section 30-3-5, 1953, as amended, which
provides in relevant part:
When a decree of divorce is made, the
court may make such orders in relation to
the children, property and parties, and
the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support and maintenance, or the distribution of the property
as shall be reasonable and necessary.
[Emphasis added.]
Of course, we would ordinarily remand
this matter to the District Court for the
purpose of taking evidence of pertinent circumstances, including intent of the parties,
at the time of the original divorce, but the
record before us discloses that such a procedure would be useless here as there was no
meaningful evidence, even that was proffered, at the 1978 hearing that would be
probative. Hence, we remand, in this unusual case, for an evidentiary hearing under
§ 30-3-5, where findings can be made on
the basis of present circumstances.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No
costs awarded.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and
STEWART, JJ., concur.
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent.
My first concern is that the majority
opinion would remand for an evidentiary
hearing for the purpose of determining
what is "reasonable and necessary" in light
of the present circumstances of the parties.1
Defendant sought no such relief below and
does not urge it on this appeal. In any
event, I do not deem him entitled to such
relief because I view the narrow issue
presented not as one in equity, but as one in
contract.
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 30-3-5.
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It is fundamental, that in order for a
court of equity to assume jurisdiction, there
must be grounds for equitable relief
presented.2 Also the •^•rit of a claim for
equitable relief is dependent upon a showing of ability to have prevented the prejudicial situation in which the litigant finds
himself.3 I* The instant case, ju^t the opposite is true. Defendant chose to contract
away certain of his rig! ^ in property and
cannot now be heard to seek equity.
I am constrained to note that if matters
of this type are to uo viewed as within the
continuing jurisdiction of the court, any
litigant, once satisfied with a stipulated divorce settlement, but becomes disenchanted
therewith because o^ a change in market
values, (up or down), need only appeal to
the court to give him a second chance by
way of reformation. Such is not the law of
contracts and should not be the law of
"equity" as it pertains to decrees of divorce
which divide property based upon stipulations.
It is noteworthy that the majority cites
no precedent for its holding and, indeed,
there appears to be none. While this Court
has not directly ruled upon the issue here
under discussion, in the case of Callister v.
Callister* the Court clearly recognized the
sanctity of property settlements as distinguished from alimony settlements In doing so, the California case of Hough v.
Hough5 was cited and the following was
excerpted therefrom:
"This does not mean that payments
under property settlement agreements
may be modified even though incorporated in the decree. Tviey may not. (Citing
cases.) But in such a situation there is
not the same underlying policy. The settlement of property rights should be final
in order to secure stability of titles. Support allowances on the other hand should
2.

27 AmJur 2d, Equity, Sec 19

3.

Id , Sec 1

4.

1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P 2d 944 (1953)

5. 26 Cal2d 605, 160 P2d 15 (1945)
6.

Although the trial judge referred (perhaps
inadvertently) to the decree of divorce as "am-

be subject to the discretion of the court
as justice may require.
It has
been loosely stated generally in passing
that the divorce court has no jurisdiction
to modify a decree based upon a property
settlement agreement. (Citing cases, including Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d
172, 44 P.2d 540 supra.) However, that
does not mean that the court does not
have jurisdiction on an application for
modification to decide correctly or incorrectly whether the decree is based upon a
property settlement agreement, and is
not subject to modification, or is based
upon alimony or support allowance covenants, and is subject to modification"
[Emphasis added.]
My next concern pertains to the confused
interpretation the majority opinion places
on the original divorce decree. At trial, the
parties were in accord that the mortgage
payments made by plaintiff from and after
the date of the divorce were to be deducted
from the house equity before it was to be
divided. Hence, the sole issue presented
was whether their agreement provided for
a division of equity as of the date of the
divorce or as of the date the property is
sold. Consequently, the sole issue presented by this appeal is whether or not the trial
court's interpretation of the decree was
proper. I deem it was.6
The stipulation of the parties, as accepted
by the court and incorporated in the decree
of divorce, plainly, and without ambiguity,
provides for a division of the equity in the
house "as of the date of the divorce" and
further provides "that the Plaintiff shall
have all of the principal payment made by
her after the date of the divorce before the
costs of sale and then the remaining equity
will be divided equally." [Emphasis added.]
biguous," I am not of the opinion that any
ambiguity exists therein In any event, even
assuming there was ambiguity, the judge resolved it in favor of plaintiff on the basis of the
evidence before him which included the proffer
of proof made by each party and the matter
should be left at rest
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The stipulation formed a binding, legal
contract, clear on its face, which should be
interpreted as a matter of law, and in accordance with its terms.7 Basic mles of
interpretation of a written document such
as this require that it be read so that its
own terms are consistent.8 The "remaining
equity" necessarily refer" to the already
established "equity at the time of the t3' •
vorce" as clearly stated in the decree. Any
other interpretation would distort the literal language of the decree.
Admittedly, the agreement reacht 1 by
the parties in settling their differences at
the time their divorce was granted apt^ears
to be weighted in favor of plaintiff stace it
assures her the return of all mortg; ^e payments made after the date of the divorce
plus one-half of the remaining equity as of
the date of the divorce; yet it is not for the
courts to question the wisdom of a contract
made by the parties. On the other hand,
we are not aware of what other matters
were considered by the parties when they
made their compromise. Defendant may
very well have received other consideration
which prompted his agreement such as concession made in regard to alimony, support,
or the division of other property.
The stipulation of the parties is clear and
unequivocal and should therefore not be
subjected to reformation based upon hindsight as to what might appear to be more
advantageous to one of the parties under
present circumstances.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E.
Banks, J., of negligent homicide. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins,
J., held that because requested instructions
as to justifiable homicide were inapplicable
to the facts of the case, the court did not
err in refusing to give them.
Affirmed.
1. Homicide $=>297
In murder prosecution, absent any evidence to show that decedent threatened
anyone with imminent use of unlawful
force or threatened death or serious bodily
injury to defendant or any third person,
defendant's requested instruction concerning justification for use of force under such
circumstances was inapplicable and was
properly refused.
2. Homicide $=>297
In homicide prosecution, wherein it was
shown that defendant threatened decedent
with a loaded gun and then shot him, trial
court properly refused requested instruction
regarding justification for use of force other than deadly force. U.C.A.1953, 76-1601(10), 76-5-206.
3. Criminal Law <&=> 1038.1(1)
Absent some reason for exception to
general rule, instructions not objected to at
trial by defendant could not be objected to
for first time on appeal, despite defendant's
contention that inconsistent instructions
were given to the jury.
8. Hartman v. Potter, Utah, 596 P.2d 653 (1979).
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